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I. INTRODUCTION 
It’s a hopeful time for the labor movement. The Protecting the Right to 
Organize Act, which would be the labor movement’s biggest legislative 
victory since 1935,2 has been passed by the House of Representatives 
after receiving President Biden’s full-throated endorsement.3 Other think-
big reforms, such as sectoral bargaining,4 are gaining mainstream 
attention.5 But a countercurrent of litigation is rippling through courts in 
the wake of Janus v. AFSCME.6 
The Supreme Court there dealt a major blow to public sector labor 
unions. But not just to these unions. Rather, Janus likely weakened these 
unions’ ability to advance economic and political equality throughout the 
country. And the decision’s mode of First Amendment analysis threatens 
other laws that strengthen both public and private sector unions’ ability to 
do so. 
 In Janus the Court overruled Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,7 
which had held that states could require public sector employees in 
unionized workforces to pay a fee—called an agency fee—to help cover 
the union’s costs of “collective bargaining, contract administration, and 
grievance adjustment.”8 Agency fees are crucial in U.S. labor law. 
Because U.S. public and private sector unions are exclusive 
representatives9 of any bargaining unit10 in which a majority of 
employees support the union, they bear a legal duty to fairly represent all 
bargaining-unit employees—regardless of whether the employee is a 
dues-paying union member. This duty imposes significant costs on the 
union: costs of negotiating and administering a collective bargaining 
 
 2.  See Celine McNicholas et al., Why Workers Need the Protecting the Right to Organize Act, 
ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE (Feb. 9, 2021), https://www.epi.org/publication/why-workers-need-the-
pro-act-fact-sheet/. 
 3.  Statement by President Joe Biden on the House Taking up the PRO Act, THE WHITE HOUSE 
(March 9, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/09/statement-
by-president-joe-biden-on-the-house-taking-up-the-pro-act/. 
 4.  In sectoral bargaining, all firms in an economic sector would together negotiate with a union 
or group of unions work conditions that bind all those firms. 
 5.  E.g. Emily Bazelon, Why Are Workers Struggling? Because Labor Law is Broken, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 19, 2020). 
 6.  138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018). 
 7.  431 U.S. 209 (1977). 
 8.  Id. at 225–26. 
 9.  This means only the union, not individual employees, may negotiate the employment contract 
that will bind those employees. 
 10.  A bargaining unit is a group of job classifications the occupants of which can effectively 
negotiate, through a union, a common contract with an employer.  
2
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agreement and processing grievances for all employees. This duty 
simultaneously incentivizes employees to free ride—that is, to use but not 
pay for the union’s services. By requiring all employees whom the union 
represents to pay a fair share of the union’s expenses related to collective 
bargaining and contract administration, agency fees prevent the free-rider 
problem from depleting unions’ resources and rendering unions 
ineffective. 
A quick note about the structure of First Amendment law will be 
helpful before I further discuss Janus. Put simply, the Court must find two 
things to conclude that a law violates the First Amendment. First, the law 
must impinge on (sometimes courts use the word ‘infringe’) the First 
Amendment, i.e. restrict someone’s ability to do something that the First 
Amendment protects. Second, the government must fail to show that it 
needs to restrict that ability to advance a compelling (or sometimes just 
important or substantial) goal.      
Janus held first that—in public sector workforces—requiring 
employees to pay the union an agency fee impinges on the First 
Amendment. The Court reasoned that “union speech in collective 
bargaining addresses” many “sensitive political topics.”11 Public sector 
unions express views in collective bargaining not only on “how public 
money is spent” but also “on a wide range of subjects—[including] 
education, child welfare, healthcare, and minority rights . . . climate 
change, the Confederacy, sexual orientation and gender identity, 
evolution, and minority religions.”12 The Court concluded that because 
agency fees therefore compel employees to “subsidize private speech on 
matters of substantial public concern,”13 requiring these fees impinges on 
the First Amendment. 
The Court next concluded that neither of Illinois’s proffered state 
interests in agency fees justified that impingement. Preventing employees 
from free riding on the union’s services is not a compelling state interest, 
the Court declared.14 Nor did the state’s interest in promoting labor peace 
justify requiring agency fees. The Court assumed without deciding that 
the state had a compelling interest in labor peace15—defined narrowly as 
an interest in avoiding the conflict and disruption that could occur in a 
workplace if multiple unions could represent that workplace’s 
employees.16 But the Court concluded that abolishing agency fees would 
 
 11.  Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2475–76.  
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. at 2460. 
 14.  Id. at 2466–68. 
 15.  Id. at 2465–66. 
 16.  Id. This definition of labor peace is narrower than the labor peace concern that partly 
motivated the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The NLRA sought to obviate bloody, costly strikes 
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not imperil that peace.17  
The principal dissent emphasized that the majority opinion disregarded 
both stare decisis and the leeway First Amendment doctrine elsewhere 
gives public employers to manage their workforces. But the dissent did 
little to affirmatively explain the value of strong labor unions to our 
democracy. Indeed, nowhere does Abood or Janus’s dissent even nod to 
what many would say was the main thing at stake in these cases: labor 
unions’ role in advancing economic and political equality.  
Part II of this Article argues that the Court should recognize a 
compelling state interest in reducing economic inequality’s transmission 
into political inequality. Part III explains why various union-
strengthening laws that the Court might decide impinge on the First 
Amendment—not just public sector agency fees—are quite plausibly 
adequately tailored to advancing that interest, as would be required for 
that interest to justify any such impingement. 
After all, the Roberts Court’s trend of expanding the scope of First 
Amendment impingement, combined with Janus’s reasoning and dicta, 
have caused many people to fear that union-strengthening laws beyond 
public sector agency fee requirements are now endangered. Already 
litigants are arguing that agency fees for private sector unions violate the 
First Amendment,18 despite the hurdle such challenges face in 
establishing state action.19 And courts have faced a swarm of suits 
alleging that public sector exclusive representation violates the First 
Amendment by compelling speech and association.20 One such suit’s 
 
that resulted from the poor working conditions that workers lacking a strong union faced. Kavitha Iyengar, 
Janus v. AFSCME, 40 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 183, 190, n.72 (2019). 
 17.  Id. at 2466.   
 18.  Rizzo-Rupon v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO Dist. 141, 822 F. 
App'x 49, 50 (3d Cir. 2020) (rejecting this argument). 
 19.  Such fees almost surely do not involve state action. The NLRA merely permits (not requires) 
private parties to enter into agency fee agreements. Yet Justice Kennedy seemingly implied during oral 
argument that he thought this permission could satisfy the First Amendment’s state action requirement. 
See Benjamin Sachs, Friedrichs and the Private Sector, ON LABOR (Jan. 14, 2016), 
https://onlabor.org/friedrichs-and-the-private-sector/. A footnote in Janus cast doubt on but expressly 
declined to resolve whether this mere permission constitutes state action. Janus, 138 S. Ct. 2479 & n. 24.  
If the Court found state action, whether it would then find First Amendment impingement is unclear. 
Private sector unions’ collective bargaining routinely addresses various of the “sensitive political topics” 
that Janus noted public sector unions address. Supra text accompanying note 16. But Janus noted that 
even if the First Amendment applied to private-sector agency fees, “the individual interests at stake still 
differ. In the public sector, core issues such as wages, pensions, and benefits are important political issues, 
but that is generally not so in the private sector.” Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2480. 
 20.  Courts have repeatedly concluded that these claims are foreclosed by Minnesota State Bd. for 
Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271 (1984). There, the Court summarily affirmed the 
constitutionality of exclusive representation, id. at 279, and further held that the state’s “meet and confer” 
statute – which required state employers of unionized workforces to confer with only the union about 
certain policy matters – did not restrict union non-members’ First Amendment right to speak or to 
associate, id. at 289–90. 
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success would likely excite similar claims against exclusive 
representation in the private sector.21 
Beyond casting shadow on these long-standing fixtures of U.S. labor 
law, Janus’s reasoning could impede various proposed reforms for 
strengthening workers’ ability to effectively organize. A Court like our 
current might find that any attempt to mandate unionization22 impinges 
on the First Amendment, even if that mandate were structured to merely 
require collective bargaining without requiring that each worker pay or be 
a member of the union.23 A more politically viable alternative to 
mandatory unionization is to require workforces to opt out of, not opt into, 
unionization.24 This proposal would address the oft-cited challenges faced 
by workforces seeking to unionize.25 And research into how opt-out and 
opt-in rules influence outcomes in other domains suggests an opt-out 
regime could substantially increase unionization.26 Yet unless this opt-out 
regime were shown to serve a state interest that Janus did not consider, 
the Court would likely invalidate it by extending Janus’s subsidiary 
 
  Courts have rejected claims that Knight’s authority is unsettled by Janus’s dictum that 
exclusive representation significantly impinges First Amendment associational freedoms. E.g. Mentele v. 
Inslee, 916 F.3d 783, 788–89 (9th Cir. 2019) But at least one court warned that Janus “arguably 
undermines some of [Knight’s] reasoning.” Bierman v. Dayton, 900 F.3d 570, 574 (8th Cir. 2018), cert. 
denied, 139 S. Ct. 2043 (2019) (mem.). 
  And courts that have reached the matter have concluded that exclusive representation would 
survive heightened scrutiny even if it did impinge on the First Amendment. These decisions note that 
Janus’s withholding strict scrutiny from agency fees, paired with Supreme Court compelled speech 
precedent, suggests courts should review any such impingement with “exacting” – but not strict – scrutiny. 
E.g. Mentele, 916 F.3d at 790 & n.3; see also Brad Baranowski, The Representative First Amendment: 
Public-Sector Exclusive Representation After Janus, 99 B.U. L. REV. 2249, 2267 & n.14 (2019) (noting 
compelled expression and compelled association claims receive a “heightened level of scrutiny” and 
“[w]here exactly this level falls on the Court's tiers of scrutiny is murky”). Concerning the Supreme 
Court’s most recent formulation of the exacting scrutiny standard, see infra note 176 and accompanying 
text. 
 21.  Such challenges could establish state action because the NLRA requires exclusive 
representation. 29 U.S.C.A. § 159(a). These challenges would then face the uncertainty discussed supra 
note 19 concerning whether private sector union speech implicates First Amendment interests as much as 
does public sector union speech. 
 22.  For argument that law should require certain workforces be unionized, see Tristan Bird, 
Representation Elections Are Incompatible with Workplace Democracy, ONLABOR (May 14, 2018), 
https://www.onlabor.org/representation-elections-are-incompatible-with-workplace-democracy/. 
 23.  Any mandatory unionization scheme would almost surely involve unions bargaining contracts 
for some workers who do not want the union’s representation, and thus, at least in the public sector, by 
Janus’s logic “significant[ly] impinge” First Amendment associational freedoms. Supra notes 19–20. As 
a gestalt matter, judges accustomed to our present system of industrial relations might blanch at a scheme 
that lets workers vote only for which union will represent them, not for whether to be unionized at all. 
 24.  For one such proposal, see Mark Harcourt et al., A Union Default for the U.S., ONLABOR (Jul. 
15, 2020), https://www.onlabor.org/a-union-default-for-the-u-s/. 
 25.  See generally, e.g., Paul C. Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-
Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769 (1983) (discussing these challenges). 
 26.  See Aaron Tang, Janus and the Law of Opt-Out Rights, HARV. L. REV. BLOG (Jul. 2, 2018), 
https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/janus-and-the-law-of-opt-out-rights/. 
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holding that the First Amendment bars an analogous opt-out regime for 
workers’ payments to unions.27  
Possibly—though unlikely—Janus’s reasoning would threaten even 
the sectoral bargaining28 model that policymakers and labor advocates 
have increasingly recommended the United States adopt to strengthen 
unions’ ability to improve workers’ conditions.29 And undoubtedly any 
ban on captive audience meetings30—a ban the PRO Act includes31—
would face First Amendment challenge.32 
Too much is uncertain in First Amendment doctrine to know which of 
the above laws the Court would find even impinge on the Amendment.33 
This Article’s focus on whether any such impingement would be justified 
does not imply that such impingement exists. Any conclusion that private 
sector agency fees involve state action would be startling. But the Roberts 
Court’s ever-widening conception of First Amendment impingement has 
treated onlookers to serial surprise. And the Court could, by extending 
Janus’s reasoning, more easily find impingement in other of the above 
cases.  
Also unclear is whether the Court would find whatever impingement 
any union-strengthening law causes to be justified by the watered-down34 
and under-theorized conception of labor peace that Janus merely assumed 
arguendo was a compelling interest.35  
 
 27.  Janus, 138 S. Ct at 2486. 
 28.  Supra note 4. 
 29.  One reason challenges to private sector sectoral bargaining would be even more tenuous than 
challenges to private sector exclusive representation is that the relationship between unions negotiating at 
the sectoral level and workers is more attenuated than that between unions negotiating at the plant or 
enterprise level and workers. The public is therefore less likely to attribute the positions that sectoral 
unions espouse to any given worker – a fact that weakens compelled speech and compelled association 
challenges. E.g. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 655 (1994). 
 30.  These are meetings employers require employees to attend, wherein employers or consultants 
express anti-union views. 
 31.  Supra note 2. 
 32.  For an evaluation of such a challenge, see Elizabeth Masson, “Captive Audience” Meetings 
in Union Organizing Campaigns: Free Speech or Unfair Advantage, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 169, 187–88 
(2005).  
 33.  For arguments that the Court erred in concluding that public sector agency fees impinge on 
the First Amendment, see sources collected in Kate Andrias & Benjamin I. Sachs, Constructing 
Countervailing Power: Law and Organizing in an Era of Political Inequality, 130 YALE L.J. 546, 604 
n.257 (2021). 
 34.  Supra note 16. 
 35.  Neither Janus nor Abood spelled out why states’ interest in avoiding the conflict that could 
occur in a workplace that multiple unions sought to represent is compelling. For a discussion of resulting 
uncertainty about whether the Court would find that states’ labor peace interest justifies any impingement 
public sector exclusive representation causes, see Tang, infra note 37, at 191–93 (concluding the Court 
should find that this interest justifies any such impingement). The Court’s failure to spell out its theory of 
why the labor peace interest is compelling also raises questions about whether that implicit theory would 
justify private sector union-strengthening laws. Analyzing those questions is beyond this Article’s scope, 
but the most convincing of the possible concerns undergirding the labor peace interest would justify 
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But what is certain is that the First Amendment, at least as the Roberts 
Court has developed it, poses enough threat to current and future labor 
law that we should consider explicating a stronger foundation for that law. 
Expounding how strong unions advance a compelling interest in reducing 
economic inequality’s transmission into political inequality aids that 
project. Doing so also has the virtue of bringing First Amendment 
analysis of labor law into better alignment with what is at stake in efforts 
to strengthen—or weaken—labor unions.  
Three last introductory notes. As elaborated below, strong unions 
reduce economic inequality’s transmission into political inequality via 
two often-overlapping but analytically distinct ways: by reducing 
economic inequality itself and by reducing the extent to which that 
inequality, once it arises, transmits to political inequality. Below, I use the 
term reducing “wealth-based political inequality” to refer to the state 
interest in reducing economic inequality’s transmission into political 
inequality, and by that term I mean to encompass an interest in both these 
ways of reducing that transmission. Because campaign finance 
regulations reduce wealth-based political inequality via the latter way, 
this Article incidentally supplements literature arguing that an interest in 
reducing economic inequality’s transmission into political inequality 
should justify campaign finance restrictions that the Court has held violate 
the First Amendment. The Court’s holding that this interest justifies those 
campaign finance restrictions would not render those restrictions less 
restrictive alternatives to union-strengthening laws, though, because, inter 
alia,36 holding that this interest justifies those campaign finance 
restrictions would not overrule the Court’s holding that those restrictions 
impinge on the First Amendment. 
Second, although this Article expounds the compelling interest in 
reducing wealth-based political inequality, my argument is not exclusive 
of arguments that the state has a compelling interest in advancing other 
forms of political equality. Rather, much of my argument applies to 
arguments that the state has a compelling interest in advancing other 
forms—such as gender- or race-based political equality. 
Third, Professor Aaron Tang argues that reimbursing unions directly 
from state coffers, rather than from fees deducted from workers’ 
paychecks, would be a less restrictive alternative for advancing any 
interest served by public sector agency fees.37 But other scholars caution 
that direct reimbursement might not be as effective at supporting strong 
 
private sector laws. 
 36.  For other reasons why not, see infra note 255.  
 37.  Aaron Tang, Public Sector Unions, the First Amendment, and the Costs of Collective 
Bargaining, 91 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 144, 177–78, 204–18 (2016). 
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unions.38 The less effective direct reimbursement is, the less likely it 
becomes a less restrictive alternative to public sector agency fees for 
reducing wealth-based inequality.39  
I do not seek to resolve whether direct reimbursement would be as 
effective at supporting strong unions as the agency fees Janus invalidated. 
After all, this Article’s intervention extends beyond the debate about 
public sector agency fees. It seeks to develop a framework for defending 
not only those fees but also other union-strengthening laws—laws to 
which Tang’s proposal does not apply. It should be noted, though, that 
applying my framework to public sector agency fees would require more 
fully addressing Tang’s argument.  
II. THE STATE HAS A COMPELLING INTEREST IN REDUCING ECONOMIC 
INEQUALITY’S TRANSMISSION INTO POLITICAL INEQUALITY. 
In this Part, I explain why the state has a compelling interest in reducing 
wealth-based political inequality. First, Section A overviews affirmative 
reasons why the Court should recognize reducing this inequality to be a 
foundational, urgent goal. Section B explains why concerns that the Court 
has raised in its campaign finance decisions should not impede the Court 
from recognizing this goal to be a compelling interest for First 
Amendment purposes.   
A. Affirmative Reasons 
Leading investigations into the Court’s jurisprudence conclude that no 
particular methodology guides the mainly ad hoc—often un- or 
underexplained—judgments the Court makes in determining whether a 
state interest is compelling.40 Sometimes the Court asserts that an interest 
is compelling because that interest itself advances constitutional values, 
 
 38.  Catherine L. Fisk & Martin H. Malin, After Janus, 107 CAL. L. REV. 1821, 1850–57 (2019); 
but see Aaron Tang, Life After Janus, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 677, 755–58 (2019) (responding to Fisk & 
Malin’s critique). 
 39.  See infra Section III.A.2. 
 40.  Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests: An Essential But Unanalyzed Term 
in Constitutional Adjudication, 68 B.U. L. REV. 917, 932–37 (1988) (“[T]he Court [usually] has failed to 
explain the basis for finding and deferring to compelling governmental interests.”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., 
Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1321–22 (2007) (“Courts and commentators have 
sometimes suggested that compelling interests can be derived from the Constitution itself . . . Sometimes, 
however, the Supreme Court labels interests as compelling on the basis of little or no textual inquiry.”); 
see also Let the End be Legitimate: Questioning the Value of Heightened Scrutiny's Compelling- and 
Important-Interest Inquiries, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1406, 1410 (2016), (noting Court often deems an interest 
compelling based on “unelaborated social or moral value judgments,” and sometimes based on “traditional 
notions about the proper functions and operation of the state”); Richard M. Re, "Equal Right to the Poor", 
84 U. CHI. L. REV. 1149, 1204 (2017) (similar). 
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goals, or rights.41 But an interest can be compelling even if it does not 
advance a constitutional end.42  
Facing an amorphous framework for identifying compelling 
interests—a framework in which constitutional, moral, and historical 
considerations all sometimes feature—I argue the government has a 
compelling interest in reducing wealth-based political inequality in part 
by reviewing leading accounts of why that inequality presents not just a 
moral or social problem, but also a constitutional problem. If reducing 
wealth-based political inequality advances constitutional values, 
decisions extrapolating compelling interests from such values offer one 
basis for recognizing a compelling interest in reducing that inequality. I 
supplement that argument by showing that traditions of historical thought 
and political theory support recognizing a compelling interest in reducing 
wealth-based political inequality and that the Court’s campaign finance 
decisions arguably have already implicitly recognized such a compelling 
interest. But before developing these arguments, I review empirical 
literature recording the extent of wealth-based political inequality in the 
United States. 
1. Empirics 
 That perceptions of the wealthy’s disproportionate political power have 
produced widespread concern and anger in the United States needs no 
citation. I instead here review scholarship confirming those perceptions’ 
accuracy. But first a few notes on terminology: my purposes here do not 
require me to choose a precise definition of “the wealthy” and “economic 
elites” whom I refer to throughout this Article as exercising 
disproportionate political power. The data discussed here reveals outsized 
political influence by persons at the ninetieth income percentile relative 
to persons at the seventieth, fiftieth, thirtieth, and tenth. This data suffices 
to show a remarkable wealth-based political inequality in the United 
States, even if more granular data would show that, for example, the top 
1% or .01% of income earners have disproportionate political power 
relative to the top two through ten percent, or that inequalities in wealth 
 
 41.  E.g. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311–13 (1978) (holding public 
university’s First Amendment right to academic freedom creates a compelling interest in being able to 
admit a diverse student body); cf. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 137 (2003), 
overruled on other grounds by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (explaining 
Court deferentially reviews Congress’s campaign contribution limits in part because interest in 
“benefit[ting] public participation in political debate,” which those limits serve, is a “constitutional 
interest[]” that “compet[es]” with the plaintiff’s constitutional speech interest). 
 42.  Mark D. Rosen, When Are Constitutional Rights Non-Absolute? McCutcheon, Conflicts, and 
the Sufficiency Question, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1535, 1538 (2015); see also Fallon, supra note 40, at 
1322 & ns. 305–06 (citing cases recognizing sub-constitutional compelling interests). 
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not captured in the income data on which I primarily rely further skew 
political influence.  
And in speaking of the wealthy and economic elites, I do not imply that 
the wealthy form a class with monolithic policy preferences or patterns of 
engaging in politics. Nor do I ignore that wealthy persons tend to 
influence politics through different channels than do wealthy business 
organizations.43 I use these terms instead as convenient shorthand to 
discuss an aggregate phenomenon of wealth-based political inequality 
that can be mitigated by strengthening unions.44  
The most comprehensive study of wealth’s impact on political 
influence focused on federal policy outcomes and concluded that the 
wealthy’s political influence dominates that of the poor and middle 
class.45 That study—conducted by Martin Gilens—found this result in all 
the policy fields Gilens studied: economic and tax, social welfare, 
foreign,46 and religious and social values.47 Specifically, Gilens compared 
federal policy outcomes to political preferences held by people in the 
tenth, fiftieth, seventieth, and ninetieth percentiles of income 
distribution.48 Gilens found that when the political preferences of persons 
at the ninetieth and tenth percentiles significantly diverge, only the 
preferences of those at the ninetieth meaningfully influence policy 
outcomes.49 He found similar results by studying outcomes when the 
ninetieth percentile’s preferences significantly diverged from the 
preferences held by people at the thirtieth, fiftieth, and even seventieth 
percentiles.50 These comparisons to the thirtieth, fiftieth, and seventieth 
percentiles help rebut the possibility that a coalition of the middle class 
and the wealthy that outvotes the poor, rather than the wealthy’s dominant 
political power, explains why policy outcomes correlate only with the 
ninetieth percentile’s preferences across the set of policy issues for which 
 
 43.  See Kate Andrias, Separations of Wealth: Inequality and the Erosion of Checks and Balances, 
18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 419, 435–36, (2015). 
 44.  Infra Section III.B. 
 45.  MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND POLITICAL 
POWER IN AMERICA 70–96 (2012). 
 46.  For other research finding similar results in foreign policy, see BENJAMIN I. PAGE & 
MARSHALL M. BOUTON, THE FOREIGN POLICY DISCONNECT: WHAT AMERICANS WANT FROM OUR 
LEADERS BUT DON’T GET 170–73, 219–20 (2006); Lawrence R. Jacobs & Benjamin I. Page, Who 
Influences U.S. Foreign Policy?, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 107, 114–17 (2005). 
 47.  Gilens, supra note 45, at 97–123. 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Id. at 79–81 (concluding that when these preferences diverge, “government policy bears 
absolutely no relationship to the degree of support or opposition among the poor.”). 
 50.  Id. at 79–82 (noting that aside from 90th percentile, “the only hint of a link between 
preferences and policies is for Americans at the 70th income percentile . . . but even for the 70th income 
percentile, the coefficient is small . . . and [statistically] nonsignificant”). 
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those preferences significantly diverge from the tenth’s.51 Indeed, Gilens 
further rebutted the possibility that majoritarian politics, rather than the 
wealthy’s dominant political power, explain his findings by examining 
what happens when the preferences of the poor and middle-class align in 
opposition to the ninetieth percentile’s preferences. Here, responsiveness 
to the ninetieth percentile “remains strong while responsiveness to the 
poor and middle class is completely absent.”52 Gilens further controlled 
for the impact of education levels and found that the foregoing results 
reflect policy bias toward the wealthy much more than toward the highly 
educated.53  
Other studies of federal policy outcomes have reached conclusions 
similar to Gilens’.54 And studies have found that the wealthy wield 
disproportionate political influence, relative to the poor, over state-level 
political outcomes too.55 These studies have also found that, at the state 
level, political inequality exists further between the middle-class and the 
poor—with the former wielding disproportionate influence relative to the 
latter.56   
Supplementing the foregoing studies’ findings that the wealthy enjoy 
disproportionate political power, Kate Andrias has catalogued how the 
wealthy gain this power. Campaign spending gives wealthy individuals 
and firms disproportionate access to legislators57 and favors candidates 
backed by the wealthy. Aside from campaign contributors receiving 
 
 51.  Id. at 83–84. 
 52.  Id. at 84 (analyzing policy issues in which preferences of fiftieth and tenth percentile align 
against preferences of ninetieth percentile).  
 53.  Id. at 93–95. 
 54.  See LARRY BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY 253–54 (2008) (concluding senators are more 
responsive to wealthy constituents and that “the views of constituents in the bottom third of the income 
distribution receive[] no weight at all in the voting decisions of their senators”). Bartels controlled for 
income-related disparities in voter turnout, which disparities did not “provide a plausible explanation for 
the [observed] income-related disparities in responsiveness.” Id. 
 55.   See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Political Powerlessness, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1527, 1580 
(2015); Patrick Flavin, Income Inequality and Policy Representation in the American States, 40 AM. POL. 
RES. 29, 42 tbl. 1 (2012) (finding low-income residents have essentially no impact, while middle-income 
and high-income residents have substantial impact, on state-level policy); Elizabeth Rigby & Gerald C. 
Wright, Whose Statehouse Democracy? Policy Responsiveness to Poor Versus Rich Constituents in Poor 
Versus Rich States, in WHO GETS REPRESENTED 189, 208–09 tbl. 7.5, 213–14 tbl. 7.6 (Peter K. Enns & 
Christopher Wlezien eds., 2011) (listing results from four models measuring state-level political influence, 
all of which find low-income residents have no impact on state-level economic or social policy while 
high-income residents have substantial impact on those policy domains, three of which find middle-
income residents have substantial impact, and one of which finds middle-income residents have minimal 
impact). 
 56.  Flavin, supra note 55; Rigby & Wright, supra note 55. 
 57.  Andrias, supra note 43, at 445; Joshua L. Kalla & David E. Brockman, Campaign 
Contributions Facilitate Access to Congressional Individuals: A Randomized Field Experiment, 60 AM. 
J. POL. SCI. 545, 556 (2016) (demonstrating that campaign contributions increase contributors’ access to 
policymakers). 
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preferential access to legislators, the wealthy also gain disproportionate 
access to legislators through lobbying. Wealthy firms and organizations 
that represent wealthy individuals are disproportionately able to offer 
lobbyists to legislators,58 and legislators rely on these lobbyists to flag 
issues worth addressing and to provide technical expertise concerning 
how to address those issues. Legislators, while shaping policy, also rely 
on their own intuitions, which some scholars have argued 
disproportionately favor the wealthy’s interests, because federal and state 
legislators disproportionately come from more affluent backgrounds or 
large firms or business organizations.59 Wealthy organizations 
additionally shape outcomes through their participation in the regulatory 
process. There is evidence that, particularly for regulatory issues that are 
complex and not highly salient, wealthy organizations are 
disproportionately able to shape regulations.60 The revolving door 
problem61 can exacerbate the regulatory influence that industry groups 
command.62  
2. The Constitutional Interest 
The above research suggests that the wealthy dominate political 
outcomes at both the federal and state level. That research suggests further 
that the wealthy dominate politics by capturing multiple branches of 
government at each level. Scholars have begun to explain how these 
outcomes betray goals the Framers sought to achieve through the 
Constitution’s structural safeguards for spreading political power across 
different political actors—safeguards including federalism, separation of 
powers, and other structural provisions in the Constitution. Scholars have 
begun to explain, that is, how the wealthy’s political dominance is not 
merely a moral or political-philosophical problem, but a constitutional 
 
 58.  See Andrias, supra note 43, at 440, 446. 
 59.  NICHOLAS CARNES, WHITE-COLLAR GOVERNMENT, 7, 19–21 (2013) (finding legislators from 
working class backgrounds more support economically redistributive policies than do legislators from 
white-collar backgrounds, and working-class persons typically comprise approximately two to three 
percent of federal and state legislatures, although comprise between fifty and sixty percent of U.S. 
population); see also Andrias, supra note 43, at 447. 
 60.  Andrias, supra note 43, at 449–51; Willian T. Gormley, Jr., Regulatory Issue Networks in a 
Federal System, 18 POLITY 595, 606–07 (1986) (“When issues are highly complex and not very salient, 
conditions are ripe for policymaking by a power elite.”); Thomas O. McGarity, Administrative Law As 
Blood Sport: Policy Erosion in A Highly Partisan Age, 61 DUKE L.J. 1671, 1745–47 (2012) (noting 
information asymmetries provide industry groups disproportionate influence over regulatory processes); 
see also supra note 55 and accompanying text (noting wealthy are disproportionately able to furnish 
lobbyists to lawmakers). 
 61.  That is, the problem whereby agency officials’ and staffers’ plans to later work for the 
industries they regulate dampens their willingness to aggressively regulate those industries. 
 62.  Andrias, supra note 43, at 450–451 (surveying literature on revolving door, while explaining 
the revolving door theory “does not hold up in all contexts”). 
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problem too. 
The conceptual starting point for this constitutional argument is that 
the Framers designed the Constitution to prevent two types of political 
pathology: first, corrupt federal officials’ “tyrannizing and plundering” 
their constituents, and second, “dominant factions of the electorate . . . 
captur[ing] the government for their own selfish ends[.]”63 The 
Constitution’s separation of powers and federalism structures ensure that 
the power to make and implement policy does not unduly concentrate in 
any one governmental institution, partly to preclude the first pathology 
above. But the Framers designed those and other structures of the 
Constitution also to guard against the second pathology. That is, to 
balance political power among different social groups.  
The wealthy’s domination of multiple—or all—branches of 
government conflicts with at least one purpose64 of the Constitution’s 
separating political power among three branches of government: the 
purpose of reducing the risk that any one “faction” would dominate 
policymaking.65 Separating powers reduces this risk because electing 
legislative and executive representatives at separate times and via 
different electorates helps ensure that officials accountable to different 
coalitions of interests can check and balance each other.66 But the 
wealthy’s dominating policymaking by both of these branches affronts 
the goal of preventing any one faction from dominating policy.67 
The Framers additionally designed certain of the Constitution’s other 
structures as tools to balance political power among different social and 
interest groups. Perhaps the chief social group division that concerned the 
Framers was the division between slaveowners and non-slaveowners. The 
Constitution established the bicameral legislature, Electoral College, and 
Three-Fifths Clause to prevent the interests of either slaveowners or of 
non-slaveowners from dominating national politics at the expense of the 
 
 63.  See Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional 
Commitment, 124 HARV. L. REV. 657, 666 (2011); Andrias, supra note 43, at 433. 
 64.  Purposes additional to democratic accountability that separating powers advances include 
“energetic, efficient government,” Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 
1729–30 (1996), competent government, see Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 
HARV. L. REV. 633, 640 (2000), and protection of fundamental rights, see id. 
 65.  Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 435 (1987) 
(“The separation of powers and the system of checks and balances were intended to reduce th[e] risk . . . 
[that] private groups, whether minorities or (more likely) majorities, might use governmental authority to 
oppress others . . . A faction might come to dominate one branch, but it was unlikely to acquire power 
over all three.”). 
 66.  AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 64 (2005) (“[B]ecause each 
government entity would be selected in a different way by a different constituency, ultimate government 
policy would reflect multiple indices of popular sentiment . . . different branches chosen at different times 
through different voting rules might together produce a more accurate and more stable composite sketch 
of deliberate public opinion.”).  
 67.  See generally Andrias, supra note 43. 
13
Taylor: Political Equality and First Amendment Challenges to Labor Law
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications,
518 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 90 
other group’s interests.68  
The Constitution’s federalism structure likewise balanced political 
power among different social groups,69 although the extent to which the 
Framers intended federalism to effect that balance is not always clear. At 
the Founding and post-ratification, there were several distinct social 
group divisions among which federalism balanced power. Again, 
slaveholders used federalism to protect their interests against a federal 
government that could otherwise better implement abolitionists’ goals.70 
More generally, different industries dominated southern and northern 
economies.71 Federalism helped prevent groups from using the federal 
government to promote industries upon which they relied at the expense 
of groups that relied on other industries.72 And constitutional historians 
have argued the Establishment Clause was originally understood to 
protect state-level religious establishments’ ability to avoid domination 
by any federally-imposed religious establishment.73 Because different 
states had established different religions, the federalist division of power 
enabled persons belonging to these different religions to gain state-level 
representation.74 Some scholars have even argued federalism functioned 
initially to protect the ability of low- and middle-income classes to 
advance their interests through state legislatures, which were more 
accountable to those classes than was the federal government75—
although these scholars have yet offered limited evidence that the Framers 
intended federalism to protect against the wealthy’s disproportionate 
political power. 
But does the wealthy’s political dominance really conflict with the goal 
that the above constitutional designs advance of balancing power among 
social groups? One might object that we should not give too much weight 
to one purpose among several that the separation of powers advances. One 
 
 68.  See Daryl J. Levinson, Foreword: Looking for Power in Public Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. 31, 
98 (2016) (“Proportional representation in the lower house of Congress and the Electoral College, 
bolstered by the Three-Fifths Clause, was supposed to guarantee that the South would soon have secure 
control over the House of Representatives and the presidency, while the greater number of Northern states 
would dominate the Senate.”).  
 69.  Id. at 83 (“[F]ederalism w[as] once conceived as mechanisms for balancing power among 
interests and social groups.”).  
 70.  Id. at 103.  
 71.  MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, THE FRAMERS’ COUP 186–90 (2016). 
 72.  See Levinson, supra note 68, at 102.  
 73.  See Adam M. Samaha, Endorsement Retires: From Religious Symbols to Anti-Sorting 
Principles, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 135, 163 (2005) (noting Establishment Clause “indicated restraints on the 
ability of the federal government to interfere with state religious ‘establishments”); Akhil Reed Amar, 
THE BILL OF RIGHTS 32–34 (1998) (“The original establishment clause . . . is agnostic on the substantive 
issue of establishment versus nonestablishment and simply calls for the issue to be decided locally.”). 
 74.  See Levinson, supra note 68, at 103 (noting “[s]everal states established different religions”). 
 75.  Joseph Fishkin & William Forbath, Wealth, Commonwealth, & the Constitution of 
Opportunity, 58 NOMOS 45, 62, 70–71 (2017).  
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could then object that the Framers’ designing other constitutional 
provisions to balance political power between certain social groups says 
nothing about whether the Framers would have been concerned with 
political power imbalances between other groups—as relevant here, 
between different economic classes. Indeed, other nations have expressly 
structured their constitutions to help balance political power between 
different economic classes.76 If the Framers wanted to preclude economic 
inequality from translating into political inequality, one might wonder, 
why did they not, for instance, establish a bicameral legislature in which 
the House would be elected only by voters of below median wealth and 
the Senate only by voters of above median wealth? Or why did they not 
use some other means to constitutionalize economic equality? 
The reason is not that the Framers thought the republic could survive 
gross economic inequality, historians argue. Gordon Wood writes that 
“[a]lthough most Americans in 1776 believed that not everyone in a 
republic had to have the same amount of property . . . all took for granted 
that a society could not long remain republican if a tiny minority 
controlled most of the wealth.”77  
Instead, one explanation scholars advance is that many Framers 
thought the government should and could adequately prevent economic 
inequalities from arising in the first place, obviating the need to 
incorporate economic class divisions into the government’s structure or 
otherwise constitutionally limit economic inequality’s transmission into 
political inequality. The United States’ political economy at the time of 
the Founding was marked by a dominantly agrarian economy in which 
the policy of expropriating territory from indigenous people made land—
back then, the primary source of wealth—seem abundant and widely 
obtainable.78 Historians have argued that this backdrop caused James 
Madison, other Framers, and early political leaders to think that policies 
that facilitated land ownership would roughly ensure economic equality 
between the members of the population who these Framers and leaders 
expected to comprise the voting polity: white, property-owning men.79 
Only by maintaining rough economic equality through such policies, John 
Adams wrote in 1776, could the republic the Framers envisioned 
succeed.80 
 
 76.  See Ganesh Sitaraman, Economic Structure and Constitutional Structure: An Intellectual 
History, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1301, 1305–11 (2016) (describing Rome as example). 
 77.  GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1789–1815 
7–8 (2009). 
 78.  See GANESH SITARAMAN, THE CRISIS OF THE MIDDLE-CLASS CONSTITUTION: WHY 
ECONOMIC INEQUALITY THREATENS OUR REPUBLIC 8 (2017).  
 79.  See id. at 8-11, 15.  
 80.  Adams wrote then that because “[political] power always follows property . . .[t]he only 
possible way . . . of preserving the balance of power on the side of equal liberty and public virtue, is to . . 
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The Framers therefore designed the Constitution against a backdrop of 
assumptions about economic equality that reflected the political-
economic conditions of the Framers’, but not our own, time. Land soon 
became limited, industrialization transitioned the United States from an 
agrarian economy and substantially shifted populations to cities, and 
corporations and trusts emerged, leading to concentrations of economic 
power that the Framers had not envisioned.81 Today, the constitutional 
premise many Framers shared—that gross economic inequality begets 
political inequality incompatible with a republic—remains. But the 
Framers’ policy premise—that the republic would prevent that ill by 
making land widely available—proved wrong. 
A second objection to my argument is that the Framers’ constitutional 
design in some ways aimed to limit the political power of economically 
subordinate groups—power some Framers worried these groups would 
leverage into laws that would violate ostensible property rights.82 State-
enacted debtor relief laws especially stoked those Framers’ concern.83  
But many scholars show that these Framers’ underlying vision here 
was to preserve the ability of putatively noble, learned legislators to 
deliberate toward proper policy outcomes, by distancing those legislators 
from any powerful “faction”—the idea being that populist pressures could 
amount to capture by faction.84 This (normatively debatable) vision is 
consistent with the Framers’ belief that excessive wealth-based political 
inequality is hostile to the republic they envisioned and that lawmakers 
 
. make a division of land into small quantities, so that the multitude may be possessed of landed estates. 
If the multitude is possessed of the balance of real estates, the multitude will have the balance of power, 
and in that case the multitude will take care of the liberty, virtue, and interest of the multitude, in all acts 
of government.” ERIC NELSON, THE GREEK TRADITION IN REPUBLICAN THOUGHT 209 (2004). 
 81.  Sitaraman, supra note 78, at 16; Fishkin & Forbath, supra note 75, at 87 (noting that by the 
time of Jackson’s presidency, “big firms and nation-spanning corporations had come to dominate the 
entire economy . . . This was the moment when the nation haltingly confronted the fact that the United 
States, like Europe, was destined to have a vast, permanent class of propertyless wage earners. It was no 
longer possible to contend that the industrial hireling was on a path to owning his own workshop, the 
agricultural tenant or laborer his own farm.”).  
 82.  See, e.g., Gerald Leonard, Jefferson’s Constitutions, in CONSTITUTIONS AND THE CLASSICS: 
PATTERNS OF CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT FROM JOHN FORTESCUE TO JEREMY BENTHAM 369, 369 (D.J. 
Galligan ed., 2015) (“The drafters of the 1787 Constitution designed the new national government to 
gather more power at the centre . . . Enhanced powers at the centre and new limitations on state powers 
would insulate government from excessively direct control of the people and limit the states’ capacities 
to violate rights of property and the like.”); JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS 
OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY 149, 218 (1990).  
 83.  See Jack N. Rakove, Confederation and Constitution, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW 
IN AMERICA: VOLUME 1, EARLY AMERICA (1580-1815) 482, 502–03 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher 
Tomlins, eds., 2008). 
 84.  See, e.g., Amar, supra note 73, at 29 (noting “the Madisonian system of deliberation among 
refined representatives” sought to ensure “each representative [w]ould be bound [not] by his relatively 
uninformed and parochial constituents [but] rather [by] his conscience, enlightened by full discussions 
with his fellow representatives bringing information and ideas from other parts of the country”); Leonard, 
supra note 82, at 369, 380 (similar). 
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should take certain actions to maintain a rough economic equality—just 
not actions violating ostensible property rights. Indeed, the founding-era 
assumption that lawmakers could maintain a rough economic equality 
among white men by distributing “open” land likely made the Framers 
complacent about detached legislators’ ability to maintain such equality. 
Rather than question that the Framers believed rough economic equality 
is necessary, we should question whether economic elites’ current 
domination of political outcomes is compatible with the Framers’ 
objective of fostering public policy that reflects legislators’ considered 
judgments about what serves the public good, rather than reflects pressure 
from a powerful faction. 
Moreover, although Madison viewed the distinction between slave 
states and non-slave states as “the great division of interests in the United 
States,”85 he thought the constitutional structures that balanced power 
among these states implemented the more general principle that “every 
peculiar interest whether in any class of citizens, or any description of 
states, ought to be secured as far as possible.”86 Gilens’ data suggests the 
United States’ economic inequality has begot a political inequality that 
undermines that constitutional goal. 
3. The Interest as Understood Historically and in Political Theory 
Traditions of historical thought and political theory likewise support 
recognizing that reducing wealth-based political inequality is a 
compelling state interest. Various political theorists have developed 
arguments why a democracy’s constituents should each have a roughly 
equal opportunity to influence political outcomes. John Rawls, for the 
most cited instance, argued that all citizens should have an 
“approximately equal” opportunity to “influence the outcome of political 
decisions”87—a goal that Rawls deemed to be equally important for 
establishing a just and free society as is the goal of ensuring 
unencumbered political speech.88 Rawls also believed economic 
inequality, by translating into political inequality, undermined this goal.89 
Because, as Section II.B elaborates, the Court’s resistance to recognizing 
 
 85.  5 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION IN THE CONVENTION HELD 
AT PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787, at 264 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1891).  
 86.  Klarman, supra note 71, at 257 (quoting 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 
1787, at 486 (Max Farrand ed., 1911 (statement of James Madison)); Levinson, supra note 68, at 98. 
 87.  JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 327 (1993).  
 88.  See Frank Pasquale, Reclaiming Egalitarianism in the Political Theory of Campaign Finance 
Reform, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 599, 601 (2008) (“Rawls argued that the . . . guarantee of roughly equal 
influence for everyone over all stages of the electoral process, is at least as high a constitutional priority 
as unfettered political speech.”). 
 89.  See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, 90–95 (1971); cf. Rawls, supra note 87, at 267. 
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an explicit compelling interest in political equality owes more to 
prudential concerns than to disagreement with the principle that a republic 
should aspire to a rough political equality, I do not here further survey 
philosophical arguments supporting that aspiration.90 
Of course, in no democracy could every constituent have exactly equal 
influence.  But the inability to specify the exact threshold at which wealth-
based political inequalities become unacceptable should not prevent us 
from recognizing that the level of distortion that Gilens’ and other studies 
have revealed is unacceptable.91 
 Nor do the Court’s precedents demand that we identify such a 
threshold before recognizing a compelling interest in reducing wealth-
based political inequality. The Court has recognized state interests in 
“[m]aintaining a stable political system”92 and in “procuring the 
manpower necessary for military purposes,”93 for instance, without 
attempting to define how much military manpower suffices or the point 
at which political instability becomes a compelling concern.94 And as 
elaborated below,95 the Court’s approach to administering constitutional 
ideals of equality in other contexts shows that it suffices to select some 
plausible threshold at which wealth-based political inequalities trigger a 
compelling interest, even if a different threshold would also have been 
plausible. 
The notion that economic inequality threatens this country’s 
constitutional structure further claims a substantial historical pedigree. As 
touched on in Part II-A(2), historians have recorded this notion’s 
Founding-era purchase.96 And post-ratification thinkers continued to 
 
 90.  For a political-theoretical account additional to Rawls’ concerning why economic inequality 
and wealth-based political inequality are hostile to a republic, see generally, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, 
Republicanism and the Constitution of Opportunity, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1427 (2016).  
 91.  Cf. Richard H. Pildes, The Theory of Political Competition, 85 VA. L. REV. 1605, 1612 (1999) 
(“In theory and in doctrine, we can often identify what is troublingly unfair, unequal, or wrong without a 
precise standard of what is optimally fair, equal, or right.”). 
  A separate but similar point is that people can agree wealth-based political inequality is a 
compelling problem even if they subscribe to different of various theories about how to best structure 
governmental representation of the citizenry. See Ganesh Sitaraman, The Puzzling Absence of Economic 
Power in Constitutional Theory, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 1445, 1467–71 (2016) (explaining why this 
inequality undermines “a variety of constitutional theories on their own terms,” including majoritarian, 
democratic, and optimistic pluralist theories, Republicanism, and other theories of representation, yet 
acknowledging this transmission is not a problem for some theories).  
 92.  Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 226 (1989). 
 93.  Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 462 (1971). 
 94.  Cf. Fallon, supra note 40, at 1271 (noting similar indefiniteness occurs whenever government 
asserts compelling interest in national security or in protecting children). 
 95.  Infra notes 166–167 and accompanying text. 
 96.  For more on how this notion pervaded that era’s thinking, see Fishkin & Forbath, supra note 
75, at 62–70 (documenting how “the revolutionary generation . . . held it a constitutional essential for the 
new United States to avoid reproducing the hierarchies, titles, and aristocratic forms of privilege and 
elitism that the colonists hoped to leave behind.  Most deemed it no less essential to supplant that 
18
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 90, Iss. 2 [], Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol90/iss2/4
2021] POLITICAL EQUALITY 523 
repeatedly regard economic inequality as a matter of constitutional 
concern. President Martin Van Buren believed that republican 
constitutionalism required permanent political organization among the 
non-wealthy to ensure that no aristocracy wielded outsized political 
influence.97 And President Jackson and his political followers argued that 
economic inequality threatened “the grand republican principle of Equal 
Rights—a principle which lies at the bottom of our constitution” in part 
because that economic inequality forms a vicious cycle with political 
inequality.98 Later, many Reconstruction-era lawmakers and citizens 
understood the Reconstruction Constitution to demand strengthening 
labor rights to combat economic inequality.99  
Through the Gilded age and into the early twentieth century, too, labor 
advocates often understood labor rights as serving this constitutional 
function.100 More generally, those eras’ reformers commonly understood 
economic inequality as posing a constitutional problem.101 These views 
found famous expression when President Franklin Delano Roosevelt 
pitched an economically redistributive “Second Bill of Rights” to create 
an “economic constitutional order”102 that would “protect majorities 
against the enthronement of” economic elites.103 Such an order, Roosevelt 
argued, would vindicate the “political equality we once had won” but that 
“economic inequality” had rendered “meaningless” for too many 
people.104 
If, for various reasons,105 today’s arguments about economic equality 
 
aristocratic order with a republic . . .  of ‘middling sorts,’ without extremes of wealth or poverty—above 
all, without a permanent class of impoverished . . . toilers or a permanent wealthy elite.”). 
 97.  Leonard, supra note 82, at 387. 
 98.  Fishkin & Forbath, supra note 75, at 75–79 (elaborating Jacksonian view that economic 
inequality presented constitutional problem). 
 99.  Id. at 83–84. 
 100.  See Joseph Fishkin & William Forbath, The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution, 94 BOSTON U. L. 
REV. 669, 684–85, 689 (2014). 
 101.  See, Fishkin & Forbath, supra note 75, at 88; cf. K. Sabeel Rahman, Domination, Democracy, 
and Constitutional Political Economy in the New Gilded Age: Towards a Fourth Wave of Legal Realism?, 
94 TEX. L. REV. 1329, 1337–44 (2016). 
 102.  Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to the Congress Reviewing the Broad Objectives and 
Accomplishments of the Administration (June 8, 1934), in THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF 
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT (New York, Random House, 1938), 3: 287, 288, 292. 
 103.  Franklin D. Roosevelt, Campaign Address on Progressive Government (Sept. 23, 1932), in 
id., 1: 752. 
 104.  Franklin D. Roosevelt, Acceptance of the Renomination for the Presidency (June 27, 1936), 
in id., 5: 230, 231–34. 
 105.  Compare Fishkin & Forbath, supra note 75, at 55 (attributing decrease in argumentation that 
economic inequality is a constitutional problem to certain historical contingencies, including a shift 
toward conceiving constitutional argument as something “more clause-bound, and more strictly tied to 
what courts enforce, than anything nineteenth-century or early twentieth-century Americans would 
recognize,” with Kate Andrias, Building Labor's Constitution, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1591, 1593–94 (2016) 
(arguing that, although “conceptually sound” arguments exist that the Constitution “support[s] rights to 
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air less often in a constitutional key, the above examples show that 
arguments proclaiming this equality’s constitutional stakes are far from 
foreign to this country’s constitutional tradition. 
4. The Doctrinal Interest 
The Court’s campaign finance decisions arguably have recognized, at 
least formerly, a compelling interest in reducing wealth-based political 
inequality.106 Before Citizens United v. FEC confirmed that only an 
interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption or its appearance can justify 
restrictions on independent expenditures, the Court in Austin v. Michigan 
Chamber of Commerce107 recognized a compelling interest in preventing 
corporations’ “immense aggregations of wealth” from distorting the 
political speech marketplace.108 Additionally, the Court in Nixon v. Shrink 
Missouri Gov't PAC109 and later cases recognized a state interest110 in 
preventing corruption defined as political officials’ privileging large 
campaign donors’ preferences.111 As Chief Justice Roberts’ Citizens 
United concurrence observed, “most scholars acknowledge” that the 
interest Austin deemed compelling was essentially the interest in political 
equality.112 And multiple scholars have noted that the corruption interest 
Nixon recognized is best understood as an interest in preventing economic 
inequality’s transmission into unequal political influence. David Strauss, 
for example, offers an extended argument why, if everyone had equal 
wealth to contribute to campaigns, elected officials’ privileging campaign 
donors’ preferences would unlikely be troubling and could instead 
improve democratic accountability by letting constituents record the 
 
decent employment and unionization,” many in the labor movement have deprioritized these arguments 
due to concerns about relying on court-derived rights to advance labor’s goals). 
 106.  Supplementing the decisions discussed below is Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 575 U.S. 433 
(2015), where the Court, in rejecting a First Amendment challenge to a law prohibiting state judges from 
personally soliciting campaign donations, invoked the judicial oath to do equal right to the poor and to the 
rich. Id. at 445. For an argument that this oath instantiates an equal right principle that supports 
recognizing economic equality as a compelling interest, see Re, supra note 40, at 1203–07. 
 107.  494 U.S. 652 (1990), overruled by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 
(2010). 
 108.  Id. at 660. 
 109.  528 U.S. 377 (2000). 
 110.  Formally the interest Nixon recognized was a “sufficiently important interest,” because Nixon 
applied a form of heightened scrutiny below strict scrutiny. Id. at 388. Nixon nonetheless is a good 
indicator of the Court’s willingness, formerly, to recognize a compelling interest in wealth-based political 
inequality. For the Court does not use a meaningfully different methodology for determining whether an 
interest is compelling than whether an interest is important. See generally Let the End Be Legitimate, 
supra note 40. 
 111.  Id. at 389, accord., e.g., McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) (plurality). 
 112.  Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 381 & n.2 (2010) (collecting 
sources). 
20
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 90, Iss. 2 [], Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol90/iss2/4
2021] POLITICAL EQUALITY 525 
salience of their political preferences.113 And, as Kathleen Sullivan notes, 
because the money that Nixon deemed corrupting goes to campaign funds 
and not candidates’ own pockets, the interest Nixon recognized does not 
reduce to the interest in preventing legislators from improperly treating 
public office as an object for personal monetary profit. It instead reflects 
a concern with “unequal outlays of political money creat[ing] inequality 
in political representation.”114 Indeed, Justice Breyer’s Nixon 
concurrence more overtly foregrounded the equality interest the majority 
there recognized, by describing the state’s interest as one in 
“democratiz[ing] the influence that money itself may bring to bear upon 
the electoral process.”115 
Although Citizens United overruled Austin and held that the state lacks 
a compelling interest in preventing corruption as defined by Nixon, even 
the interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption that Citizens United 
deemed compelling retains an equality element. Sullivan’s, and to some 
extent Strauss’s, arguments both apply to quid pro quo corruption.  
But the precise extent to which the interest in preventing quid pro quo 
corruption reduces to a concern with wealth-based political inequality is 
not here important.116 What matters is, first, that Austin and Nixon show 
that the Court has recognized state interests that boil down to the interest 
in reducing wealth-based political inequality. This history suggests that 
judicial recognition of this latter interest is no pipe dream. And, second, 
that even the narrower interest Citizens United substituted for the interests 
that Austin and Nixon recognized embodies, to a significant extent, a 
concern with wealth-based political inequality.  
B. Prudential Concerns 
There are therefore substantial affirmative arguments that the 
government has a compelling interest in reducing wealth-based political 
inequality. But any argument in favor of this interest should address the 
concerns that have caused the Court in its campaign finance decisions—
starting with Buckley v. Valeo117—to so far reject a broader compelling 
interest in political equality full-stop.118 Scholars have explained that the 
 
 113.  David A. Strauss, What Is the Goal of Campaign Finance Reform?, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 
141, 142–49 (1995); see also RICHARD HASEN, PLUTOCRATS UNITED: CAMPAIGN MONEY, THE SUPREME 
COURT, AND THE DISTORTION OF AMERICAN ELECTIONS 81-82 (2016) (same). 
 114.  Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political Money and Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 663, 
678–79 (1997); Strauss, supra note 113, at 144, 148 (same). 
 115.  Nixon, 528 U.S. at 401 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 116.  Concerning other conceptualizations of that interest, see generally Yasmin 
Dawood, Classifying Corruption, 9 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y 103 (2014). 
 117.  424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 118.  Buckley rejected a compelling interest in “equalizing the relative ability of individuals and 
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Court has rejected a compelling interest in political equality not because 
political equality is an uncompelling goal in principle, but because the 
Court has worried lawmakers could—through laws ostensibly aimed at 
equalizing political speech—try to suppress dissent, to more generally 
retaliate against disfavored viewpoints, or to otherwise entrench 
themselves in office.119  
Then-professor Elena Kagan more specifically argued that two 
premises have caused the Court to reject a compelling interest in political 
equality. First, legislators have inherent incentives to pursue these bad 
motives, which raises the risk that laws aimed at altering the speech 
market will advance these motives.120 Second, the difficulty of measuring 
whether different groups do have disproportionate political influence 
hinders the Court’s ability to assess whether a speech regulation 
ostensibly advancing political equality does advance that goal or instead 
advances only the aforementioned bad motives.121  
But as elaborated below, the emergence since Buckley of databases 
recording groups’ policy preferences at the federal and state levels 
suggests that measuring groups’ political influence is more viable than 
this second premise credits—at least as to gender, race, and income.122 
While we can question whether lacking reliable methodologies for 
measuring groups’ political power warranted the campaign finance 
decisions’ even initially rejecting a compelling interest in political 
equality, this new data especially calls for reevaluating that rejection. 
To discuss the fears Kagan noted, I below organize the Court’s stated 
reasons for rejecting a compelling interest in political equality into two 
analytically distinct, although functionally overlapping, concerns. First, 
the concern that legislators will use political equality as a pretext for laws 
 
groups to influence the outcome of elections.” Id. at 48. The Court reasoned that “the concept that 
government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice 
of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment” – a much-criticized conclusion the Court announced 
without citing direct support. Id. The Court later applied Buckley to reject various regulatory schemes 
meant to equalize electoral candidates’ financial resources. In Davis v. Fed. Election Comm'n, the Court 
rejected a compelling interest in “level[ing] electoral opportunities for candidates of different personal 
wealth.” 554 U.S. 724, 741 (2008) 741.  Later, Arizona Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett 
concluded at a higher level of generality that “the government has [no] compelling state interest in 
‘leveling the playing field’ that can justify undue burdens on political speech.” 564 U.S. 721, 749  (2011). 
 119.  David A. Strauss, The Equality Taboo, 2015 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 509, 511–12 (2015); Elena 
Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 
63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 468–72 (1996).  
 120.  Id. at 469.  
 121.  Id. at 469–70. 
 122.  See Stephanopoulos, supra note 55, at 1531, 1572–1602 (demonstrating that recently 
available data at federal and state levels permits assessing whether these groups’ “aggregate policy 
preferences are less likely to be enacted than those of similarly sized and classified groups”); see also 
supra notes 45–55 and accompanying text (detailing studies assessing income-based disparities in 
political influence at federal and state levels). 
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that entrench their (or their party’s) incumbency. Second, the concern that 
an interest in equalizing political influence lacks a limiting principle. 
1. Entrenchment Concerns 
The most common way the Court has expressed the entrenchment 
concern in its campaign finance decisions is by noting that campaign 
finance restrictions inherently advantage incumbent legislators over non-
incumbent candidates because the latter depend more than the former on 
campaign spending.123 But at least one Justice has explicitly worried that 
legislators may use such restrictions to increase the relative power of 
groups on whom the legislators partly rely for reelection.124  
Some Justices would likely harbor a similar concern with recognizing 
a compelling interest in reducing wealth-based political inequality in the 
labor law context. Legislators’ goals in strengthening unions might be not 
only to reduce wealth-based political inequality, but also to strengthen the 
political clout of an institution that tends to support Democrats.125 In fact, 
Justice Kennedy hinted, during Janus’s oral argument, that unions’ 
political clout counseled in favor of invalidating Illinois’ agency fees 
statute—although he did not explain why that clout so counseled.126  
This section’s remainder addresses Justice Kennedy’s possible 
concerns. I first explain why any legislative intent to use union-
strengthening laws to increase the electoral prospects of specific 
legislators, or of Democrats in general, would not constitute viewpoint 
discrimination. I then argue that legislators’ enacting these laws with at 
least some motive to entrench themselves or their party should not 
otherwise preclude those laws’ being justified by a compelling interest in 
reducing wealth-based political inequality. I finally argue that the threat 
that these laws will effect that entrenchment—regardless of legislative 
motive—should not preclude their being justified by that compelling 
interest. 
 
 123.  See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 56–57, (1976). 
 124.  Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 692 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 125.  Although labor unions contribute to both major political parties, unions have historically 
offered more support to Democrats. Daryl Levinson & Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and 
Public Law, 125 YALE L.J. 400, 436 n.133 (2015). 
 126.  When the union’s lawyers agreed that “if [they] d[id] not prevail in this case, the unions will 
have less political influence,” Justice Kennedy asked, ““Isn't that the end of this case?” Transcript of Oral 
Argument at 54, Janus, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (No. 16-1466), 2018 WL 1383160. Justice Kennedy did not note 
that unions use this influence disproportionately to support Democrats. We can wonder whether his 
concern would remain if unions’ political influence were evenly distributed among political parties. 
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i. Bolstering Political Allies is Not Viewpoint Discrimination 
Justice Kennedy unlikely thought that legislators’ enacting laws partly 
with the goal of strengthening groups who politically support them ipso 
facto constitutes viewpoint discrimination. For that claim seems 
untenable. Daryl Levinson and Ben Sachs explain how legislators enact 
innumerable laws that have the potential and often the goal of 
strengthening entities or coalitions that support these legislators or their 
party.127 Even if the Court believed legislators enact union-strengthening 
laws partly to increase political speech favoring Democrats, the Court’s 
holding that these laws therefore viewpoint discriminate would require 
the Court to address why countless laws of the sorts that Levinson and 
Sachs identified do not also viewpoint discriminate. For instance, if 
minimum wage earners disproportionately favor Democrats, would 
minimum wage laws violate the First Amendment because they 
predictably increase these workers’ resources to engage in political 
speech supporting Democrats? Would laws weakening unions viewpoint 
discriminate because they predictably reduce speech supporting 
Democrats?  
Any holding that union-strengthening laws are viewpoint 
discriminatory based on the Court’s belief that legislators enacted those 
laws to strengthen unions’ ability to support Democrats would not only 
lack a limiting principle. Such a holding would additionally face doctrinal 
barriers. For starters, United States v. O’Brien128 should foreclose 
speculations about this motive. O’Brien stands for the proposition that, 
although the government’s restricting speech for viewpoint-
discriminatory reasons impinges on the First Amendment, the Court’s 
tools for sussing out such motive do not include freewheeling 
speculation.129 The Court instead limits itself to doctrinal tools as proxies 
to sleuth such motives. In particular, the Court uses divergent standards 
of review for laws depending on whether those laws are facially 
viewpoint-discriminatory, content-based, or content-neutral.130 The Court 
does so due to the conceptual and evidentiary difficulties that inquiries 
 
 127.  Levinson & Sachs, supra note 125, at 407–08, 426–55 (2015) (illustrating “three general 
mechanisms of functional entrenchment. First, politicians, parties, and temporarily prevailing coalitions 
can enact substantive policies that strengthen political allies or weaken political opponents. Second, they 
can enact policies or programs that change the composition of the political community, selecting in allies 
or selecting out opponents. Third, they can shift the locus of political decision making to an actor or 
institution that is responsive to allies or unresponsive to opponents.”). 
 128.  391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
 129.  Kagan, supra note 119, at 492; see O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 383 (“[T]his Court will not strike 
down an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive.”). 
 130.  Kagan, supra note 119, at 443–92. 
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into legislative motive inevitably face.131 And although inferences of 
impermissible legislative intent are a doctrinally-sound basis for finding 
violations of the Equal Protection Clause,132 the First Amendment’s 
Establishment Clause,133 and the First Amendment’s Free Exercise 
Clause,134 O’Brien remains good law at least as to non-religion First 
Amendment allegations.135 
Even if O’Brien did not bar the Court’s freestyle speculation into 
entrenchment motive, the Court held in Rucho v. Common Cause,136 
where plaintiffs alleged that partisan gerrymanders violate the First 
Amendment, that legislators' intentionally bolstering coalitions that 
support their political party does not in itself constitute viewpoint 
discrimination or otherwise impinge on the First Amendment.137 And 
assuming that Rucho’s First Amendment holding should not be limited to 
the partisan gerrymandering context just because the decision reasoned 
partly from considerations specific thereto,138 Rucho counsels against any 
distinction between legislators’ bolstering favorable political coalitions 
by diluting the power of partisan opponents’ vote and by altering the 
electoral speech marketplace. For Rucho acknowledged that partisan 
 
 131.  There are conceptual barriers to defining what would constitute any legislator’s intent, 
“[c]onsider[ing] that each legislator possesses a complex mix of hopes, expectations, beliefs, and 
attitudes.” Kagan, supra note 119, at 438. These conceptual difficulties compound when we consider that 
legislatures have many members. Id.; O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 384.  
  These conceptual difficulties dissolve if we seek to identify, not “the” or “a” “legislative 
intent,” but instead any motivation that was a but-for cause of a law’s enactment. E.g. Laurence H. Tribe, 
The Mystery of Motive, Private and Public: Some Notes Inspired by the Problems of Hate Crime and 
Animal Sacrifice, 1993 S. CT. REV. 1, 33 n. 79. But although but-for motive is a coherent concept, the 
Court has no reliable way to sleuth out such motive. Kagan, supra note 119, at 440. Accordingly, the 
Court relies on the proxies I listed in the main text for identifying impermissible intent. Although those 
proxies are imperfect, “the alternative– a direct inquiry into motive –will produce even more frequent 
errors.”  Id. at 453. 
 132.  Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 
118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
 133.  Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 586–87 (1987). 
 134.  Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534 (1993). 
 135.  E.g. First Resort, Inc. v. Herrera, 860 F.3d 1263, 1278 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 136.  139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019). 
 137.  Id. at 2504 (holding that legislators’ intentionally using redistricting to weaken the ability of 
voters to form a prevailing coalition for the opposing party does not impinge on the First Amendment). 
 138.  Rucho reasoned partly that the Framers’ choice to entrust districting to legislatures, whom the 
Framers knew would engage in partisan gerrymandering, counsels against holding that partisan 
gerrymanders violate the First Amendment. Id. at 2494–97. But separate from this argument about 
Framers’ intent, Rucho reasoned also that some partisan motivation is inevitable in legislative redistricting 
and courts lack judicially manageable standards for determining a threshold at which such partisan 
motivation becomes unconstitutional. Id. at 2504–05 and Gaffney passage there cited. This latter reasoning 
supports finding that legislative motive to bolster partisan coalitions through means other than 
gerrymandering likewise does not, standing alone, violate the First Amendment, given this motive’s 
inevitable entanglement with countless laws and the lack of manageable standards for identifying 
impermissible legislative intent. Supra notes 127–131 and accompanying text. 
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gerrymanders impair the disadvantaged party’s ability to elicit 
volunteers.139 
One might think a different analysis were due if union-strengthening 
laws improved Democrats’ chances by restricting speech favoring 
Republicans. But they do not. Assuming arguendo that private sector 
exclusive representation restricts rights to speak, that restriction limits 
only a worker’s ability to negotiate terms of employment with her 
employer. This speech is arguably, by Janus’s logic, political speech for 
First Amendment purposes. But this speech is no vehicle for electoral 
advocacy. And other challenges to union-strengthening laws do not allege 
restriction of a worker’s right to speak.140 
Nor could a plaintiff try to distinguish Rucho by arguing agency fees 
force her to aid speech favoring Democrats. None of the ways agency fees 
strengthen unions’ electoral political advocacy, elaborated below,141 
involve compelling anyone to fund that advocacy. Nor could unions do 
so: the Court’s longstanding holdings that unions may not require anyone 
to subsidize union speech on electoral politics remain good law.142  
ii. Entrenchment Motive Should Not Preclude a Compelling Interest 
More likely, then, Justice Kennedy’s concern was that an agency fees 
statute’s being enacted to some extent due to legislators’ entrenchment 
motives would vitiate the state’s claim that the statute advances 
compelling interests in labor peace and preventing free riders. Yet the 
Court has never explained why the threat of entrenchment motives or 
effects should in itself bar finding that a compelling interest in political 
equality justifies a First Amendment-impinging law that advances that 
equality.  
Kagan’s account seemingly explains why not: arguing that 
entrenchment motive and entrenchment effect should not invalidate a law 
that advances political equality is beside the point if the Court lacks 
reliable means of ensuring that the law does so. But because recent 
 
 139.  Id. at 2504. 
 140.  Challenges to agency fees and to public sector exclusive representation raise only compelled 
speech and association claims. Public sector exclusive representation cannot restrict rights to speak 
because the state’s greater power to negotiate with no employees includes a lesser power to negotiate 
with, as it were, only some. See Thompson v. Marietta Educ. Ass’n, 371 F.Supp.3d 431, 435 (S.D. Ohio 
2019) and transcript cited therein. 
 141.  Infra notes 220–226 and accompanying text. 
 142.  Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U.S. 209, 235 (1977) (holding First Amendment bars 
requiring objecting workers to fund union spending for “the expression of political views, on behalf of 
political candidates, or toward the advancement of other ideological causes not germane to [the union’s] 
duties as collective-bargaining representative”; Commc'ns Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 762–
63 (1988) (interpreting NLRA to not authorize collective bargaining agreements that permit unions to 
require objecting workers to fund such spending). 
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advances in data improve the Court’s ability to measure whether laws do 
advance political equality,143 I address here why neither the threat of 
entrenchment motive nor of entrenchment effect should in principle bar 
recognizing a compelling interest in reducing wealth-based political 
inequality.  
Again, although the Court has, in the context of the First Amendment’s 
religion clauses, circumvented O’Brien’s bar on inquiries into legislative 
motive, O’Brien shows at least that there is no uniform First Amendment 
anti-pretext principle that would require the Court to deny a compelling 
interest in political equality based on the Court’s speculating that 
legislatures were only pretextually advancing that interest.  
Are there nonetheless good other reasons for the Court to deny this 
compelling interest based on such pretext concerns? An affirmative 
answer seems unlikely even if we set aside the conceptual and evidentiary 
concerns that inquiries into legislative motive raise.144 Imagine first 
(implausibly) that no legislators who voted for a hypothetical First 
Amendment-impinging law that does advance political equality at all 
hoped to thereby advance political equality. Imagine they all merely 
hoped to entrench their incumbency. Even if so, that motive should 
unlikely in itself preclude a compelling interest in political equality from 
justifying the law. First, the point of permitting compelling interests to 
justify First Amendment impingements more likely is to permit state 
action that advances a state of affairs that crucially benefits a polity, than 
to ensure the legislature’s subjective satisfaction whenever the legislature 
wants to advance such a state of affairs. Second, any goal of 
disincentivizing or punishing unseemly legislative motive unlikely 
warrants invalidating the law. For if advancing political equality were 
important enough to justify a First Amendment impingement when the 
legislature intended to advance that political equality—a position that 
follows from any claim that a law would be justified by a compelling 
interest in political equality but for concerns that entrenchment motives 
underly the law—why would advancing that political equality not be 
important enough to outweigh the court’s distaste for crass political 
motives that are not themselves unconstitutional?145    
And of course, the legislative motive underlying any law that 
meaningfully advances political equality would surely be, at worse, 
 
 143.  Supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
 144.  Supra note 131 (describing those barriers). 
 145.  Supra Section II.B.1(i) (explaining that legislators’ intent to entrench themselves is not 
unconstitutional). For detailed discussion of when and why governmental motive should matter in First 
Amendment analysis, see Kagan, supra note 119, at 505–14 (concluding there are appreciable arguments 
why governmental motive is important to First Amendment analysis, but explicitly not endorsing any 
claim that motives should be more important to that analysis than a law’s effects).  
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mixed. At least one Court opinion has already explained that a law serves 
a compelling state interest when legislators enacted the law to advance 
two goals: one of which is a compelling state interest and the other of 
which is not.146 Granted, the non-compelling motive at issue in that 
opinion was not a bad motive. But, per the reasoning in the above 
paragraph’s last two sentences, that unlikely makes a difference.  
iii. The Threat of Entrenchment Effect Should Not Preclude a 
Compelling Interest 
A separate possibility is that the campaign finance decisions rejected a 
compelling interest in political equality based not on the Court’s concern 
that legislators intended to entrench themselves but instead on the concern 
that these laws threatened to in fact excessively entrench incumbents. 
James Gardner argues “[w]hat may be the strongest slippery slope 
challenge to campaign spending restrictions rests on the fear that such 
measures, however well-motivated, will have the unintended 
consequence of giving incumbents an advantage over challengers so 
significant that even the most rudimentary kind of democratic 
accountability will be destroyed.”147 
But this ground for rejecting a compelling interest in reducing wealth-
based political inequality faces doctrinal and practical objections. Take 
doctrinal first. For the Court to reject a compelling interest on grounds 
that actions advancing that interest could excessively entrench 
incumbents logically requires that the Court adopted some judgment of 
what constitutes excessive entrenchment.148 That judgment is in tension 
with the Court’s having deemed partisan gerrymandering claims non-
justiciable on the ground that the Court has no manageable standards for 
deciding how much entrenchment is “too much.”149  
 
 146.  Justice Kagan’s dissent in Arizona Free Enter. Club made this point, which the majority did 
not dispute. Arizona Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 782 (2011) (Kagan, 
J., dissenting). 
 147.  James Gardner, Anti-Regulatory Absolutism in the Campaign Arena: Citizens United and the 
Implied Slippery Slope, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 673, 676 (2011) (proceeding to refute this slippery 
slope challenge). 
 148.  The Court’s doing so does not require deciding the precise threshold at which entrenchment 
becomes excessive. But it logically requires finding that the amount of entrenchment that could plausibly 
result from recognizing this compelling interest would be excessive. 
 149.  See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2498 (2019); Deborah Hellman, Defining 
Corruption and Constitutionalizing Democracy, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1385, 1412–13 (2013). A 
counterargument is that Rucho feared the politicization of courts that occurs when courts must repeatedly 
make these decisions without manageable standards, Rucho, 139 S.Ct. at 2507, and that rejecting a 
compelling interest in political equality once and for all based on entrenchment concerns is not 
comparably politicizing. But Rucho presented the Court’s lack of competence to determine what 
constitutes excessive entrenchment as a basis for its holding that is seemingly independent from the 
concern that adjudicating partisan gerrymandering cases would politicize courts. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 
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One practical objection to the Court’s rejecting a compelling interest in 
political equality based on a concern about entrenchment effects is that to 
do so ignores alternative routes to the same harm: that ninety-five percent 
of incumbent candidates between 1980 and 2006 won their elections 
shows incumbents are already extremely hard to defeat and there is little 
room for First Amendment-impinging laws that advance political equality 
to increase incumbent entrenchment.150 And the Court would similarly 
ignore alternative routes to entrenchment if its concern were that a law 
ostensibly advancing political equality will entrench a political party, 
given Levinson and Sachs’ survey of the innumerable strategies that 
parties use to entrench themselves.151 
Perhaps most important, the claim that legislators may use laws 
ostensibly advancing political equality to entrench themselves or their 
party tells only half the entrenchment story. Gilens’ data, combined with 
the wealthy’s tendency to favor laws that protect and strengthen their 
economic and political advantage, shows that preventing legislative 
bodies from adjusting imbalances in political power threatens to 
perpetuate class entrenchment.152 Barring a compelling interest in 
reducing wealth-based political inequality on grounds that this interest 
could produce excessive incumbent- or party-entrenchment implicitly 
adopts a view that the costs of whatever incumbent- or party-  
entrenchment such reforms threaten exceed the costs of the class 
entrenchment that such reforms could reduce153— a view not obviously 
right. 
A different way to put the point is to recognize that the concern that 
legislators will entrench themselves is a concern that they will cause 
themselves to remain in office via some obstruction of the way we want 
democracy to function.154 I have in this Article assumed agreement with 
 
2507 (“Any judicial decision on what [constitutes excessive entrenchment would be] beyond the 
competence of the federal courts.”). 
 150.  Gardner, supra note 147, at 705–15 (showing that the argument that the threat of excessive 
entrenchment justifies barring a compelling interest in political equality suffers four characteristics of 
weak slippery slope arguments). 
 151.  Supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
 152.  For one economist’s account of how the wealthy leverage their outsized political influence to 
increase their economic advantage, creating a vicious cycle between economic inequality and political 
inequality that entrenches the wealthy’s power, see JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY: HOW 
TODAY’S DIVIDED SOCIETY ENDANGERS OUR FUTURE 35–104, 119 (2012). 
 153.  See Jedediah Purdy, Beyond the Bosses' Constitution: The First Amendment and Class 
Entrenchment, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2161, 2162 (2018). 
 154.  See Levinson & Sachs, supra note 125, at 409 (“[T]he persistence of politicians or parties in 
office . . . is not necessarily proof of entrenchment. If politicians [or] parties . . . are retained simply 
because they continue to be popular among the electorate, this would not be viewed as entrenchment. 
Entrenchment implies that the political system is not responsive to changes in voters' preferences; a system 
that is perfectly responsive to unchanging preferences would be viewed as a well-functioning 
democracy.”). 
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the premise that, in principle, a democracy’s constituents should each 
have a roughly equal opportunity to influence political outcomes.155 
Arguing that a law that advances wealth-based political equality causes 
entrenchment of legislators or of a political party requires showing not 
just that the law makes certain legislators or a certain party more likely to 
retain office. It requires additionally showing that the law does so by 
creating political inequalities along an axis other than wealth such that the 
law overall moves us further from the ideal of each constituent having a 
roughly equal opportunity to influence political outcomes.      
2. No Limiting Principle 
Another reason the Court has rejected a compelling interest in political 
equality is that the Court has feared that this interest lacks a limiting 
principle.156 Indeed, there are countless conceivable ways that certain 
entities or persons are positioned to utter speech that disproportionately 
influences political outcomes. A leading objection to recognizing a 
compelling interest in correcting distortions in political influence is that 
this interest could seemingly justify media censorship on grounds that the 
press or certain media outlets have disproportionate political influence.157 
Other of the many ways persons or groups are unequally situated to 
influence political outcomes or to get elected include differences in 
wealth, celebrity status,158 cheap leisure time,159 charisma,160 and strength 
of group or campaign organization.161  
Scholarship elsewhere refutes that this slippery slope concern warrants 
rejecting a compelling interest in political equality.162 For this Article’s 
purposes, then, it suffices to add that framing the compelling interest that 
 
 155.  Supra text accompanying notes 87-90. 
 156.  See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 360 (2010); McConnell v. Fed. 
Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 296–97 (2003), (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 157.  Id. 
 158.  Samuel Gedge, "Wholly Foreign to the First Amendment": The Demise of Campaign 
Finance's Equalizing Rationale in Davis v. Federal Election Commission, 128 S. Ct. 2759 (2008), 32 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1197, 1197–98 (2009). 
 159.  David A. Strauss, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance Reform, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 
1369, 1384 (1994). 
 160.  Strauss, supra note 119, at 521. 
 161.  Id.  
 162.  See generally Gardner, supra note 147; see also, e.g., HASEN, supra note 113, at 117–23 
(rebutting slippery-slope-to-censorship argument), 124–45 (rebutting argument concerning slippery slope 
to excessive media regulation independent of censorship motive), 146-60 (rebutting slippery-slope-to-
excessive-entrenchment argument); cf. Purdy, supra note 153, at 2176 (explaining how doctrines letting 
polities impinge on the First Amendment to advance political equality can “be neutral both (1) in the 
formal sense that they do not require free-roaming, case-by-case judicial decisions about the distribution 
of political power and (2) in the substantive sense that they implement a version of the idea that the state 
is obliged not to make invidious distinctions among citizens”). 
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justifies union-strengthening laws as an interest in reducing wealth-based 
political inequality rather than in advancing political equality more 
generally could blunt the edge of the Court’s concern. This narrower 
interest could justify only laws that reduce economic inequality’s 
transmission into political inequality in a manner consistent with the 
Court’s narrow tailoring principles. The foregoing paragraph’s parade of 
horribles suggests that there are seemingly much fewer ways that First 
Amendment impingements plausibly advance that interest consistent with 
narrow tailoring principles than there are ways that such impingements 
could, consistent with those principles, reduce any source of political 
inequality.  
Of course, the Court’s having abstracted the interests recognized by 
Nixon and Austin into interests in advancing political equality full-stop 
suggests the Court might chafe at recognizing a compelling interest in 
wealth-based political equality as distinct from one in political equality 
full-stop.163 But scholars have noted the Court could adopt a compelling 
interest in combatting certain distortions of political influence without 
committing itself to recognizing an interest in combatting other 
distortions.164  
And the emergence since Buckley of robust data recording income-
based political inequality165 vitiates the Court’s concern that recognizing 
an interest in wealth-based political equality would invite First 
Amendment-impinging laws that ostensibly advance such equality but 
whose efficacy and necessity the Court cannot meaningfully assess. 
While I do not here try to hash out the optimal way to use this data to 
implement an administrable standard for evaluating such laws’ efficacy 
and necessity, this data suggests administrable standards are likely 
available. The Court could—similar to how it has in administering its one 
person one vote rule166—select some plausible threshold at which 
discrepancies in political influence trigger a compelling interest.167 The 
 
 163.  Supra note 112. 
 164.  Hellman, supra note 149.  
 165.  Supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
 166.  To administer the constitutional requirement of one person one vote, the Court deems 
legislative districting schemes presumptively compliant if “the maximum population deviation between 
the largest and smallest district is less than 10%.” Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1124 (2016). This 
shows that the Court can and does use plausible and administrable standards to constitutionalize political 
equality, even if the Constitution did not itself require the Court to choose whatever standard the Court 
selected instead of some other plausible and administrable standard. See Strauss, supra note 159, at 1385 
(“‘One person, one vote’ is an example of . . . a workable conception of equality. ‘One person, one vote’ 
is not the necessary or inevitable rule for voting in a democracy . . . The great virtue of that principle is 
[instead] that it is a plausible account of democratic equality that is, relatively speaking, very easy to 
administer.”). 
 167.  I do not address whether the Court should use a metric comparing inequalities in political 
influence between two points on the income distribution (e.g., a comparison between the 90th and 10th 
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Court could then rely on contemporaneous simulations of studies, such as 
those discussed earlier in this Article,168 to assess whether that threshold 
is exceeded. 
Any such standard might be more helpful for proving that the polity 
suffers enough wealth-based political inequality to have a compelling 
interest in reducing that inequality than for proving that a challenged law 
advances that interest.169 But once courts have such a standard for 
showing that the state has a compelling interest in reducing such 
inequality, courts could likely rely on the type of reasoning and metrics I 
consider below in Section III-B to evaluate whether a challenged law 
advances that interest.170  
III. UNION-STRENGTHENING LAWS ARE PLAUSIBLY ADEQUATELY 
TAILORED TO THIS INTEREST.  
Recognizing a compelling interest in reducing wealth-based political 
inequality would be only the first step in justifying any labor laws the 
Court may think impinge on the First Amendment. Next the Court would 
need to conclude that those laws are adequately tailored to serving that 
interest. This Part begins to develop an analysis of whether union-
strengthening laws are adequately tailored. Although I focus particularly 
on showing why public-171 and private sector agency fees are quite 
plausibly adequately tailored to that interest, the analysis below could be 
transferred to defend other union-strengthening laws by showing how 
those laws strengthen unions’ ability to reduce economic inequality and 
to organize poor and middle-class people’s political power.172  
 
percentile) or instead a metric that accounts for inequalities in political influence across the whole income 
distribution. 
 168.  Section II.A.1. 
 169.  This limitation is particularly apparent for challenged laws that were enacted before the time 
periods that the studies collected in Section II.A.1 observed. For such laws, we could not use successive 
iterations of those studies to compare the wealth-based political inequality that existed before and after 
those laws were enacted. 
 170.  Possibly the Court could even rely on one of those metrics to establish its standard for how 
much inequality triggers a compelling interest. The Court might decide that the studies I considered supra 
Section II.A.1 satisfactorily establish that economic inequality does, when it exists, transmit into political 
inequality. The Court could then choose a certain threshold of economic inequality – perhaps as measured 
by the 90/10 ratio or by the Gini coefficient – that triggers a compelling interest in reducing wealth-based 
political inequality. This approach would remove any need to run new simulations of the studies 
considered supra Section II.A.1 contemporaneously with litigation that questions whether an interest in 
reducing wealth-based political inequality justifies a given law. 
 171.  But cf. notes 37–39 and accompanying text. 
 172.  The NLRA requires exclusive representation once a union acquires majority support because 
the NLRA’s sponsors believed such representation makes unions more effective advocates for workers. 
Nat’l Lab. Relations Bd., Advice Memorandum, Dick’s Sporting Goods, Case 6-CA-34821 (June 22, 
2006) at 8. Testing this hypothesis is challenging because U.S. labor law has not experimented with 
members-only unions since the NLRA’s enactment and because labor law in countries that allow 
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Below, I use the narrow tailoring framework associated with strict 
scrutiny although the union-strengthening laws this Article considers 
would likely receive sub-strict “exacting” scrutiny.173 I do so mainly 
because, particularly if courts extend Americans for Prosperity 
Foundation v. Bonta’s174 recent formulation of the standard for exacting 
scrutiny beyond the context of laws that compel disclosure, questions and 
principles that I explain guide strict scrutiny would also guide a court 
deploying exacting scrutiny, with a key difference between strict and 
exacting scrutiny being that the latter does not require that challenged 
state action be the least restrictive means of achieving the state’s asserted 
interest.175 My discussion of less restrictive alternatives below thus does 
not imply that governments would need to show that a challenged union-
strengthening law is the least restrictive means to advance the interest in 
reducing wealth-based political inequality.  
A. Narrow Tailoring Principles 
 In this Section, I review principles that shape strict scrutiny’s narrow 
tailoring inquiry. First, I specify the five questions that the narrow 
tailoring inquiry asks of challenged state action. I then discuss four 
considerations the Court does or should take into account in answering 
those five questions. My discussion reveals principles and sites of 
doctrinal uncertainty that will inform any inquiry into whether union-
strengthening laws are adequately tailored to reducing economic 
inequality’s transmission into political inequality.  
1. Five Overarching Questions 
The narrow tailoring inquiry asks five questions.176 First, causation: 
 
members-only unions differs from U.S. labor law in many other ways. Applying this Article’s framework 
to challenges to exclusive representation would thus substantially rely on the deference principles 
developed infra III.A.4. 
  In contrast, there is more evidence that sectoral bargaining strengthens unions’ ability to reduce 
economic inequality and organize poor and middle-class political power. See Kate Andrias, The New 
Labor Law, 126 YALE L.J. 2, 94 (2016); Michael L. Wachter, Labor Unions: A Corporatist Institution in 
a Competitive World, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 581, 631–32 (2007). 
  Showing that an opt-out unionization regime increases long-term unionization rates would go 
far in transferring my analysis below to defend such a regime. Significant evidence supports such a 
showing. E.g. supra notes 25–26. 
 173.  Supra note 20.  
 174.  141 S. Ct. 2373 (2021). 
 175.  Id. at 2383, 86–87 (“While exacting scrutiny does not require that disclosure regimes be the 
least restrictive means of achieving their ends, it does require that they be narrowly tailored to the 
government’s asserted interest.”). Whether and how courts will apply this standard to laws that trigger 
exacting scrutiny outside the compelled disclosure context remains to be seen. 
 176.  Here I slightly modify Richard Fallon’s explication by explicitly noting the causality 
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does the challenged law advance the state’s compelling interest? Second, 
necessity: must the state advance this interest by impinging on First 
Amendment rights through the challenged law, or could the state, with 
comparable efficacy, advance this interest through means that do not 
impinge on, or that less impinge on, those rights?177 Below I refer to such 
means as “less restrictive alternatives.” Third, under-inclusiveness: has 
the state failed to regulate conduct that poses a threat to the compelling 
interest comparable to the threat posed by the conduct that the challenged 
law regulates?178 Under-inclusiveness does not necessarily invalidate the 
challenged action.179 Fourth is over-inclusiveness. Save for a distinction 
not here relevant, the over-inclusiveness inquiry duplicates the necessity 
inquiry by asking whether the challenged action impinges on First 
Amendment rights more than is necessary to advance the compelling 
interest.180 Over-inclusiveness does not necessarily invalidate the 
challenged action either.181 Fifth is proportionality. The Court seemingly 
has never expressly noted that its narrow tailoring analysis includes a 
proportionality inquiry. But scholars have observed that in facing 
inevitable questions about how much over- or under-inclusiveness is too 
much—particularly in cases where the challenged action merely reduces 
rather than eliminates the harm that the state has a compelling interest in 
avoiding—courts must conduct an implicit proportionality inquiry to 
decide “whether a particular, incremental reduction in risk justifies a 
particular impingement of protected rights in light of other reasonably 
available, more or less costly and more or less effective, alternatives.”182 
2. Efficacy-sensitivity 
The Court has never clearly resolved whether a proposed less 
restrictive alternative must be as effective as the challenged state action 
in advancing the government’s compelling interest—nor whether, if it 
 
requirement that inheres in the necessity requirement. See Fallon, supra note 40, at 1321–31.  
 177.  Id. at 1326. 
 178.  Id. at 1327. 
 179.  Id. at 1327. 
 180.  Id. at 1328–29.  
 181.  Id. 
 182.  Id. at 1330–31. Numerous other scholars have likewise noted that the narrow tailoring prong 
requires courts to conduct an implicit proportionality analysis. E.g. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 722–23 (1978). And scholars have amply argued why the Court should explicitly 
embrace a structured proportionality inquiry when reviewing claims of constitutional rights’ violations. 
See generally, e.g., Jamal Greene, Rights as Trumps?, 132 HARV. L. REV. 28 (2018); see also A Shield 
for David and a Sword Against Goliath: Protecting Association While Combatting Dark Money Through 
Proportionality, 133 HARV. L. REV. 643, 643–45 (2019) (arguing a proportionality approach advances 
ends the First Amendment aims to advance). 
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need not be as effective, how close is close enough.183 The Court has in 
some cases suggested that challenged state action survives strict scrutiny 
if the proposed less restrictive alternative less effectively advances the 
state’s compelling interest.184 But other times the Court has at least 
implicitly indicated that a proposed less restrictive alternative need not as 
effectively advance the state’s compelling interest.185  
The important point is that a proposed less restrictive alternative’s 
being less effective cuts against, even if it does not necessarily bar, 
requiring the state to pursue that alternative. And the Court’s lacking any 
clear rule for how comparably effective a less restrictive alternative must 
be supports scholars’ conclusions that the Court must conduct a relatively 
ad-hoc proportionality analysis to decide whether the government must 
forego the challenged state action.186 I therefore below provide reasons 
why alternative means of advancing the state’s interest in reducing 
wealth-based political inequality may be less effective, without trying to 
quantify that efficacy gap. 
3. Cost-sensitivity 
Nor has the Court developed clear standards to evaluate when if ever 
the government must pursue a proposed less restrictive alternative that 
imposes financial costs that the challenged state action does not. In Bd. of 
Regents of Univ. of Wisconsin Sys. v. Southworth,187 the Court held that 
although students whom a university required to pay fees to support an 
extracurricular program that expressed political viewpoints to which 
those students objected receive “some First Amendment protection,” the 
state need not refund objecting students’ fees, because doing so “could be 
so . . . expensive” as to threaten the extracurricular program’s 
existence.188  Elsewhere, Justice Breyer has noted that the narrow 
 
 183.  Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Law in an Age of Proportionality, 124 Yale L.J. 3094, 3118–
19 (2015).  
 184.  Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656, 669 (2004) (“The Government’s burden 
is . . .  to show that a proposed less restrictive alternative . . . is less effective.”); see also id. at 666 
(suggesting challenged state action must have “some additional” efficacy relative to proffered alternatives 
to withstand strict scrutiny); Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997) (noting, but 
without clarifying whether the Court was articulating a necessary or a sufficient condition, that “[t]he 
[state action’s] burden on . . . speech is unacceptable if less restrictive alternatives would be at least as 
effective in achieving th[at] [action’s] legitimate purposes”). 
 185.  Sable Commc’ns of Cal. V. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 128–30 (1989) (invalidating a complete ban 
on indecent phone communications, because “extremely effective” alternative safeguards that “only a few 
. . . young people” would circumvent were less restrictive alternatives for serving the state’s interest in 
shielding youth from such communications). 
 186.  Supra note 182. 
 187.  529 U.S. 217 (2000).  
 188.  Id. at 232.  
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tailoring analysis is sensitive to governmental budgetary pressures—a 
point the majority did not dispute.189 And in a case where the government 
argued a proposed alternative was too expensive, the Court rejected that 
argument not in principle, but instead only after the challenger agreed to 
pay for the alternative’s added expense.190 
Granted, the Court has elsewhere indicated it might require the 
government to pursue a less restrictive alternative even if that alternative 
is more expensive than the challenged action.191 Recently, in Burwell v. 
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,192 the Court mused in dicta that a less 
restrictive alternative to requiring objecting employers to fund 
employees’ contraceptive coverage might be to require the government to 
fund that coverage.193 The Court suggested two conditions must prevail 
before it might require the government to pursue any such alternative. 
First, the cost of government funding must be “minor when compared 
with the overall cost of” the governmental program (there, Obamacare) 
of which the challenged state action was part.194 Second, the Court hinted 
that requiring the government to pursue an alternative entailing such 
minor costs might be improper if that requirement imposed “a whole new 
program or burden on the Government.”195  
For present purposes, Burwell suggests that the Court may require the 
government to pursue an alternative that is costlier than the challenged 
state action only if the additional cost is minor. I therefore below offer 
reasons why requiring the government to increase taxes to replace a 
union-strengthening law’s role in reducing wealth-based political 
inequality might impose costs that are more than minor. I do not try 
answering here what we should say is the program of which union-
strengthening laws are part—which strict Burwell fidelity would demand 
we use as the denominator for determining these costs’ magnitude. Nor 
do I try answering whether the changes to tax law necessary to render tax 
an as-effective alternative would effectively constitute a new 
governmental program or burden. 
 
 189.  Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656, 688–89 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting); 
cf. U. S. Postal Serv. V. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass’ns, 453 U.S. 114, 135 (1981) (Brennan, J., 
concurring) (arguing “preventing loss of mail revenues” is a “significant governmental interest”). 
 190.  See United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 824 (2012). 
 191.  See Roy G. Spece, Jr., The Most Effective or Least Restrictive Alternative as the Only 
Intermediate and Only Means-Focused Review in Due Process and Equal Protection, 33 VILL. L. REV. 
111, 149–50 (1988) (citing examples, but concluding that at some point a proffered less restrictive 
alternative’s greater expense bars the Court from requiring the state to pursue it.). 
 192.  573 U.S. 682 (2014). 
 193.  Id. at 728. 
 194.  Id. 
 195.  Id. at 738–39 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy provided a fifth vote for the majority 
opinion seemingly subject to this limitation. 
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4. Deference to Legislatures’ Predictive Judgments 
The Court has advanced no clear rule concerning what deference it 
gives to the government’s factual findings concerning causation or 
necessity. But a recurring theme is that the Court accords factual findings 
substantial deference when those findings amount to predictive 
judgments.196 The Court in Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC197 explained 
that, at least as to Congress’s “predictive judgments” bearing on the 
“factual necessity” of challenged state action, the Court will not “reweigh 
the evidence de novo” or “replace Congress' factual predictions with [its] 
own,” but instead will require only that Congress “has drawn reasonable 
inferences based on substantial evidence.”198  
Whether Turner’s rule applies of its own force to strict scrutiny is 
unclear. Turner and a later opinion applying its rule applied heightened 
but not strict scrutiny.199 Nowhere did these opinions purport to limit their 
rules to sub-strict heightened review. But even if these rules governed 
only sub-strict heightened review, they would seemingly govern 
challenges to private sector agency fees and likely any compelled speech 
and compelled association challenges to exclusive representation or 
sectoral bargaining. For Janus applied only “exacting” scrutiny to agency 
fees.200 Although Janus suggested agency fees might warrant strict 
scrutiny, the Court would unlikely subject private sector agency fees to 
strict scrutiny, because doing so would imperil a range of subsidies and 
fees in other contexts.201 And lower courts have repeatedly noted that 
exclusive representation would face only exacting scrutiny.202 
Furthermore, the Court in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project203 
signaled that deference to predictive judgments is also appropriate during 
strict scrutiny. The Court there held it must “grant weight” to Congress’s 
“empirical conclusions” in matters concerning national security and 
 
 196.  The Court in other areas of law similarly accords greater deference to predictive than to non-
predictive empirical conclusions. See Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 
87, 98, 103 (1983) (holding that in reviewing administrative agencies’ discretion, a “court must generally 
be at its most deferential” when the agency “is making predictions, within its area of . . . expertise, at the 
frontiers of science . . . as opposed to [making] simple findings of fact”). 
 197.  512 U.S. 622 (1994). 
 198.  Id. at 665–66; accord McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 165–66 (2003), 
overruled on other grounds by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 199.  Turner, 512 U.S. at 635; McConnell, 540 U.S. at 165–66. 
 200.  Janus v. Am. Fed'n of State, Cty., & Mun. Employees, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2465 (2018).  
 201.  William Baude & Eugene Volokh, Compelled Subsidies and the First Amendment, 132 HARV. 
L. REV. 171, 196–201 (2018) (discussing Janus’s implications for bar dues and public university student 
activity fees). For argument that agency fee statutes should receive strict scrutiny, see Tang, supra note 
37, at 185–90. 
 202.  See supra note 20. 
 203.  561 U.S. 1 (2010).  
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foreign affairs, because these are areas where (1) “information can be 
difficult to obtain,” and (2) “the impact of certain conduct can be difficult 
to assess.”204 At least this latter characteristic echoes Turner’s claim that 
courts should reasonably defer to legislative predictive judgments about 
the necessity of First Amendment-impinging laws. 
True, Holder involved national security—an area where the Court in 
many legal contexts is especially deferential to the political branches. But 
likewise the Court’s deference to predictive judgments is a theme that 
marks other legal contexts.205 There is thus little warrant for limiting 
Holder to national security cases rather than reading it to endorse 
deference to predictive judgments in strict scrutiny generally, particularly 
given that Holder expressly cited the predictive nature of the 
congressional judgments as why deference was due.  
5. Political Feasibility and the Inside-Outside Problem 
We might think that a proposed less-restrictive alternative’s politically 
infeasibility should not help a challenged law survive strict scrutiny. If 
the state’s interest is truly compelling, this intuition runs, the state’s 
electorate and representatives will have sufficient will to enact an 
alternative policy that effectively advances that interest. This intuition 
seems sensible in many contexts, although its exact logic is unclear.206 
But this intuition is misplaced at least when the compelling interest is 
combatting distortions in the political process itself.207 The Court has 
seemingly never addressed how this intuition would apply in that context. 
But it would be odd for the Court to assume that the political infeasibility 
 
 204.  Id. at 34–35. 
 205.  Supra note 191.  
 206.   The intuition embodies an evidentiary and a predictive principle. The evidentiary principle is 
that a less restrictive alternative’s being politically infeasible discredits the claim that the asserted interest 
is compelling because that infeasibility is probative that the polity’s electorate and elected representatives 
do not widely and deeply view the interest that the alternative and challenged action advance to be 
exceedingly important. But whether the polity’s weak attachment to that interest discredits the claim that 
this interest is compelling for strict scrutiny purposes is unclear. Because constitutional rights check 
majoritarianism, what makes an interest compelling for strict scrutiny purposes unlikely reduces to how 
many of the polity’s members deem the interest terribly important. If, however, we conceive the 
compelling interest analysis as examining certain (ostensibly) objective indicia of an interest’s weight – 
such as the interest’s relevance to a society’s ability to properly function, see supra note 40 (noting Court 
has not clarified what makes an interest compelling) – a polity’s weak attachment to the interest could 
conceivably be probative that the interest is not compelling. 
  The predictive principle is that the interest’s being compelling discredits the claim that a less 
restrictive alternative is politically infeasible. That is, because the interest is compelling – regardless of 
what exactly makes it compelling – the polity will surely muster the will to enact the alternative if the 
Court invalidates the challenged action. 
 207.  The narrow tailoring prong’s cost-sensitivity arguably shows that, even in other contexts, the 
Court has not reflexively assumed that a polity’s lacking the political will to enact a proposed less 
restrictive alternative discredits that the interest is compelling.  
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of a proposed alternative for reducing wealth-based political inequality 
discredits the claim that a polity’s members widely and deeply view that 
interest as compelling,208 after the Court recognized this to be a 
compelling interest on the ground that such inequality impedes 
legislatures’ enacting laws that have widespread and deep support in the 
polity. Alternatively, it would be odd for the Court to assume that the 
importance of reducing wealth-based political inequality will persuade 
the wealthy to not render a proposed less restrictive alternative politically 
infeasible by organizing their opposition to that alternative. Either of the 
above assumptions would suffer from the “inside/outside fallacy”: the 
phenomenon whereby a legal theory first diagnoses a problem caused by 
certain actors’ having certain motives and then prescribes a solution to 
that problem that assumes those same actors lack those same motives.209 
The tailoring prong in this context should instead be sensitive to how the 
wealthy’s undue influence can block a state from enacting a proposed less 
restrictive alternative.   
The Court should exercise this sensitivity in at least two ways. These 
two considerations should not hand the government a trump card to 
defend laws that reduce wealth-based political inequality. But these 
considerations should at least make the Court pause before striking down 
such laws in cases where it is highly contested that there is even any First 
Amendment impingement.210 Again, Janus was such a case. So would be 
any challenge to private sector agency fees, public- or private sector 
exclusive representation, or private sector sectoral bargaining. 
 First, the Court should not assume that a state that has overcome the 
wealthy’s influence to enact a challenged law can again overcome that 
influence, if the Court invalidates that law, to enact an alternative. Given 
Gilens’ data, we can expect economically redistributive laws to often be 
products of fragile, fleeting political coalitions. Any of various reasons 
might explain why a winning coalition converged around one means (Law 
One) rather than another (Law Two) for reducing wealth-based political 
inequality. But even if a coalition could have prevailed to enact Law Two 
when Law One was enacted, that would not mean that the coalition could 
prevail to enact Law Two later. Contingent conditions that at Time One 
opened a policy window to challenge the wealthy’s influence may lapse 
by Time Two. 
 
 208.  See also supra note 206 (questioning that claim’s relevance).  
 209.  See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Inside or Outside the System?, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1743, 1744–45 (2013). 
 210.  Cf. Purdy, supra note 153, at 2185 (“Institutions that balance the power of wealth by enabling 
working people to combine for effective advocacy–in collective bargaining and in the broader contests of 
politics–should be assumed to be compatible with First Amendment interests unless there is a very strong 
showing to the contrary.”). 
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That our federal and state governments structurally tend toward inertia 
further suggests that the battle to replace Law One with Law Two would 
likely wage uphill. Our federal and state governments split 
decisionmaking among three branches, and divided the legislative branch 
into two houses,211 partly to make enacting legislation more difficult. And 
some scholars have argued that the degree of gridlock our federal and 
state governments currently suffer exceeds even what federal and state 
constitutional framers intended. Jack Balkin, for instance, argues that 
“when combined with today's highly polarized political parties, veto 
points that once promoted bargaining and compromise now produce 
intransigence and gridlock.”212 Again, the wealthy are disproportionately 
able to use these veto points to block policies they disfavor through 
strategic campaign spending, lobbying, and their involvement in 
regulatory processes.213    
Second, the Court should consider whether evidence that a proposed 
alternative would more effectively reduce wealth-based political 
inequality should counsel to some extent against requiring the state to 
pursue that alternative. For we might expect the wealthy to even more 
fiercely resist a more effective alternative, further reducing the state’s 
chances of enacting that alternative to replace a challenged law. Although 
it is unclear exactly when the Court should refuse to require a less 
restrictive alternative on grounds that the alternative would be too 
effective and therefore politically unfeasible, I hope it will seem obvious 
that the particular tax and transfer regime I discuss in Section III-C(2) is 
one example of where the Court should so refuse. 
B. Causation 
There are two analytically distinct but mutually reinforcing ways 
whereby unions mitigate wealth-based inequalities in political 
influence.214 First, by organizing low-income and middle-class people to 
countervail the wealthy’s political power in influencing public policy. 
Second, by reducing economic inequalities. In turn there are two 
analytically distinct but mutually reinforcing ways that unions reduce 
economic inequalities. First, through their above-mentioned organizing 
of political power to shape public policy—a function I below call 
 
 211.  Except for Nebraska, where the legislature is unicameral. 
 212.  Jack M. Balkin, The Last Days of Disco: Why the American Political System Is Dysfunctional, 
94 B.U. L. REV. 1159, 1165 (2014). 
 213.  Andrias, supra note 43, at 472, 484; see also id. at 455 (noting that business interests “tend to 
contribute strategically to members of both parties in order to obtain influence over key chokeholds,” and 
providing examples of strategic giving to legislative committee members). 
 214.  These correspond to two of the four possible approaches to reducing wealth-based political 
inequality noted infra notes 249-250 and accompanying text. 
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“political advocacy.”215 Second, via collective bargaining with 
employers—through which unions increase the compensation workers 
receive.  
1. Organizing Countervailing Political Power 
We can reasonably expect that the public policies unions advance by 
organizing low-income and middle-class people’s political power would 
include economically redistributive policies. And below I offer examples 
showing this is so. But insofar as the state’s compelling interest is 
reducing economic inequality’s transmission into political inequality—
rather than reducing economic inequality because economic inequality is 
per se bad—evidence that unions increase lawmakers’ responsivity to 
low-income and middle-class voters’ political preferences, and that a 
challenged union-strengthening law helps unions do so, should suffice to 
establish that that law advances the state’s compelling interest, even 
absent evidence showing that unions advance economic equality.  
And Gilens offers evidence that unions increase that responsivity. After 
noting that strong interest groups can mitigate wealth-based political 
inequality, he concludes that “unions are among the most important 
political forces moving federal policy in a direction desired by the less 
well-off.”216 This finding does not surprise. For Gilens found that unions 
rank among the interest groups in the United States whose policy 
positions most strongly positively correlate with the “preferences of the 
less well-off.”217 And not only do unions align themselves with these 
positions, but unions have organized low-income and middle-class 
persons on a scale greater than any other non-party group, helping unions 
persuade lawmakers to turn these preferences into policy.218 Indeed, 
multiple studies show a correlation between union density and legislators’ 
votes for the positions unions advocate.219 
But do agency fees strengthen unions’ political advocacy? Evidence 
suggests yes, even though agency fees cover only costs relating to 
collective bargaining and contract administration. A recent study 
concluded that agency fees do so after controlling for other relevant 
differences between so-called right to work states (i.e., states that bar 
 
 215.  I use this shorthand while mindful that, per Janus, collective bargaining is also in a sense 
political advocacy. 
 216.  Gilens, supra note 45, at 157–58. 
 217.  Id. at 157. 
 218.  Benjamin I. Sachs, The Unbundled Union: Politics Without Collective Bargaining, 123 YALE 
L.J. 148, 168–69 (2013) (noting that labor unions at their peak represented over one-third of the country’s 
wage earners).  
 219.  See id. at 171 & notes 100–03 (collecting studies). 
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agency fees) and agency fee states.220 That conclusion is unsurprising 
considering that right-to-work laws force unions to shift resources from 
political advocacy and voter turnout to efforts to persuade workers to pay 
their fair share of union representation.221  
Beyond that study’s finding that right-to-work laws force unions to 
redirect money that unions could have spent on political advocacy, other 
research suggests right-to-work laws reduce the amount of money even 
initially available for unions’ political advocacy. One study shows that 
public sector workers in agency fee states were more than twice as likely 
to be union members than were public sector workers in right-to-work 
states.222 Union members, unlike non-members, pay dues to fund not only 
the union’s costs of collective bargaining and contract administration but 
also the union’s political advocacy.223 This study therefore means public 
sector workers in agency fee states were more than twice as likely to 
financially support unions’ political advocacy than such workers in right-
to-work states.  
There are reasons to think agency fees might cause some of, not merely 
correlate with, that higher rate of union membership. First, there is 
substantial, albeit contested, evidence that agency fees make unions more 
effective in their workplace representation.224 And workers are likely 
more willing to pay a union to represent their interests outside the 
workplace once they have seen that unions can powerfully represent their 
interests inside the workplace.225 Second, the marginal cost to workers of 
paying membership dues is lower in agency fee states than in right-to-
work states, because these workers’ alternative to paying membership 
dues is to pay an agency fee, rather than to pay nothing. These workers 
are therefore more likely to pay membership dues to fund the union’s 
political advocacy and to gain other membership benefits. Third, free 
riding in right-to-work states can drive union membership below a 
 
 220.  James Feigenbaum, Alexander Hertel-Fernandez, & Vanessa Williamson, From the 
Bargaining Table to the Ballot Box: Political Effects of Right to Work Laws (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Res., 
Working Paper No. 24259, 2018). The study found right to work laws reduced county-level democratic 
vote shares in in federal and state elections. Id. at 4. Part of this effect seemingly owes to right-to-work 
laws’ decreasing voter turnout by reducing unions’ ability to mobilize voters. See id. at 11–15. The study 
also found evidence suggesting that right-to-work laws reduce economically redistributive state policy 
and reduce the number of state legislators from working class backgrounds, although the authors’ ability 
to show that right to work laws cause not merely correlate with these outcomes was limited. Id. at 19–23. 
 221.  See id. at 6, 16. 
 222.  Elizabeth McNichol, Weaker Unions Could Mean More Income Inequality in States, CENTER 
ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES (March 6, 2018), https://www.cbpp.org/blog/weaker-unions-could-
mean-more-income-inequality-in-states. 
 223.  Supra note 142. 
 224.  Infra notes 243-244. 
 225.  See Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, Economics versus Politics: Pitfalls of Policy 
Advice, 27 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 173, 177–79 (2013) (arguing so). 
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majority of a collective bargaining unit, increasing the union’s 
vulnerability to decertification.226 
2. Advancing Economic Equality  
Economists and sociologists have offered evidence that unions also 
advance economic equality. Unions reduce economic inequality through 
collective bargaining by causing employers to increase workers’ overall 
compensation. Studies have found that the average income for unionized 
employees exceeds that for non-unionized employees by ten to twenty 
percent.227 Indeed, studies have shown that unions can weaken 
employers’ power to drive down wages in monopsonized labor 
markets.228 That is, markets in which employers insufficiently compete 
with each other to attract workers—markets that many recent studies 
conclude are increasingly common. Although some economists have 
argued that unions cause non-unionized workers’ compensation to 
decrease and in this sense exacerbate economic inequality, other 
economists have concluded that unions can increase non-unionized 
workers’ compensation. One way unions do so is by causing non-union 
employers to raise wages to disincentivize their employees from 
unionizing.229 
Granted, some researchers have questioned the relationship that many 
studies find between collective bargaining and economic equality. These 
researchers argue that recent decades’ increases in economic inequality 
owe little to unions’ declining strength—or at least less to that decline 
than to technological change that raises demand for so-called skilled 
labor.230  
 
 226.  Janet C. Hunt & Rudolph A. White, The Effects of Right-to-Work Legislation on Union 
Outcomes: Additional Evidence, 4 J. LAB. RES. 47–63 (1983). 
 227.  E.g. Henry S. Farber et al., Unions and Inequality over the Twentieth Century: New Evidence 
from Survey Data 19–24 (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 24587, 2018) (finding that union 
wage premium has steadily stayed within this range over past eighty years); Brantly Callaway & William 
J. Collins, Unions, Workers, and Wages at the Peak of the American Labor Movement, in EXPLORATIONS 
IN ECONOMIC HISTORY, 95, 112–14 (Elsevier Vol. 68(c), 2018). 
 228.  E.g. Efraim Benmelech et al., Strong Employers and Weak Employees: How Does Employer 
Concentration Affect Wages? 16 (U.S. Census Bureau Ctr. Econ. Studies, Working Paper No. 24307, 
2018). 
 229.  Mathieu Taschereau-Dumouchel, The Union Threat, SOC’Y FOR ECON. DYNAMICS MEETING 
PAPERS (2011); Henry S. Farber, Nonunion Wage Rates and the Threat of Unionization, 58 INDUS. & 
LAB. RELATIONS REV. 335 (2005). 
 230.  Compare, e.g., Daron Acemoglu & Philippe Aghion, Deunionization, Technical Change, and 
Inequality 251 in 55 CARNEGIE-ROCHESTER CONFERENCE SERIES ON PUBLIC POLICY 229 (2001) 
(concluding that “although [such technological change rather than] deunionization” is “the primary cause 
of the surge in wage inequality,” deunionization “amplifies the original effect of skill-biased technical 
change by removing the wage compression imposed by unions”); with Ömer Tuğrul Açıkgöz & Barış 
Kaymak, The Rising Skill Premium and Deunionization, 63 J. MONETARY ECON. 37, 38 (2014) 
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But recent research plumbing new data sources suggests collective 
bargaining has exerted a powerful causal impact on economic 
inequality.231 And evidence suggests unions advance economic equality 
not only through collective bargaining but also through their political 
advocacy. Unions were arguably the most powerful political force that led 
to Congress’s enacting Medicare and minimum wage increases since 
Congress enacted the Fair Labor Standards Act in 1938.232 Again, studies 
show a correlation between union density and legislators’ votes for the 
policies unions advocate, including redistributive tax and social welfare 
positions.233 
Whether unions reduce wealth-based political inequality by reducing 
economic inequality—rather than just by causing lawmakers to better 
respond to non-economically-redistributive political preferences held by 
low-income and middle-class people—almost surely depends on whether 
unions reduce economic inequality between economic brackets that 
possess unequal political influence. A detailed analysis of that question is 
outside this Article’s scope. But evidence suggests unions do.  
Gilens found that, at the federal level, people at the ninetieth income 
percentile possess political influence dominating that of people at the 
seventieth, fiftieth, thirtieth, and tenth percentiles.234 Even were the 
government’s interest only in reducing the economic (and thus political) 
power of people at or above the ninetieth economic percentile, studies 
suggest unions do so by reducing the ninety/ten ratio235 and top ten 
percent’s income share.236 These findings are likely supported by separate 
studies finding that private sector unions redistribute profits from firm 
 
(concluding that unions have little effect on the equilibrium wage distribution). 
 231.  Farber et al., supra note 227, at 2–3, 24, 32–33. These authors further argue that researchers’ 
tendency to emphasize the causal impact on inequality of supply and demand for so-called skilled labor, 
rather than of unionization, may owe to the fact that micro-level data is more readily available for persons’ 
education status before 1973 than for persons’ union membership status before that year. These authors 
use a new source of micro-level data documenting union membership status over the past 80 years. 
 232.  Sachs, supra note 218, at 170–71; THEODORE R. MARMOR, THE POLITICS OF MEDICARE 18 
(2d ed. 2000) (noting that organized labor was “the most powerful single source of pressure” in the fight 
to enact Medicare). 
 233.  Supra note 218.  
 234.  Supra notes 45–53 and accompanying text. 
 235.  This ratio compares the 90th percentile income to the 10th percentile income. 
 236.  Farber et al, supra note 227, at 32–33 (finding the “rise (decline) in union density between 
1940–1960 (1970–2004) can explain” approximately 5-15% of the “decline (rise) in the 90/10 ratio”); id. 
at 4 (finding increasing union density decreases top ten percent’s income share).  
  One might worry that people at the 99th or 99.9th percentile could independently dominate 
politics if only the power of people at the 90th percentile were reduced. Were that so, research assessing 
unions’ ability to reduce economic inequality between persons at the 99th or 99.9th percentile and other 
percentiles would help assess how much unions reduce wealth-based political inequality by reducing 
economic inequality as opposed to by causing lawmakers to better respond to non-economically-
redistributive political preferences held by low-income and middle-class people.  
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managers237 and shareholders238 to workers. Public sector unions of 
course do not similarly redirect money from shareholders and firm 
managers through collective bargaining. Toward assessing how much 
public sector unions reduce the ninety/ten ratio and top ten percent share, 
future research could disaggregate how much unions reduce the 
ninety/ten ratio and top ten percent income share through political 
advocacy rather than through collective bargaining. 
In light of findings that the middle class has disproportionate political 
influence relative to the poor at the state level, 239 unions’ recorded impact 
on the Gini coefficient,240 which summarizes inequality across the entire 
income distribution,241 might further demonstrate that unions advance 
economic equality between groups with disparate political influence. 
Research showing that public sector unions lift people into the middle-
class brackets that enjoy state-level political influence could be a way—
separate from demonstrating public sector unions’ impact on the 
ninety/ten ratio or top ten percent income share—to show that public 
sector unions reduce wealth-based political inequality by reducing 
economic inequality. 
How do agency fees help unions advance economic equality? The 
extent to which agency fees improve union density and unions’ ability to 
increase workers’ compensation through collective bargaining is 
uncertain.242 Studies that have controlled for variables correlating with 
 
 237.  John DiNardo et al., Unions and the Labor Market for Managers 17, 23, (Inst. Lab. Econ, 
IZA Discussion Paper No. 150, 2000) (concluding “the pay of managers or related occupations is reduced 
by about 5 to 7 percent in an industry that is completely unionized compared to one that is non-union”). 
 238.  See, e.g., David Lee & Alexandre Mas, Long-Run Impacts of Unions on Firms: New Evidence 
from Financial Markets, 1961–1999, 127 Q. J. LAB. ECON. 333, 334–35 (presenting data indicating 
shareholders expect unionization to decrease their dividends by approximately ten percent). Evaluating 
how redistributing profits from shareholders to workers impacts economic inequality would require 
assessing the portion of income that different economic brackets receive from shareholdings, including 
through institutional investors. I do not try to assess that. But the outsized share of stock and mutual fund 
assets that the top 1% and top 10% of wealth-holders own suggests that unions’ redistributing wealth from 
shareholders to workers would reduce the most wealthy’s economic (and so political) power. See Edward 
N. Wolff, Household Wealth Trends in the United States, 1962-2013: What Happened over the Great 
Recession? 2 RUSSEL SAGE FOUND. J. SOC. SCI. 6, 37 tbl.5 (2016) (showing that as of 2013, the top 1% 
of the wealth distribution hold 49.8% of stock and mutual fund assets. And accounting for indirect 
ownership through retirement plans and similar accounts, the top 10% own 81.4% of those assets.). 
 239.  Supra note 55. 
 240.  See Farber et al., supra note 227 at 32–33 (finding the “rise (decline) in union density between 
1940–1960 (1970–2004) can explain” between approximately five and fifteen percent of the “decline 
(rise) in the . . . Gini coefficient[]”). 
 241.  The Gini coefficient is a way to provide an aggregate summary of income or wealth inequality 
across all income percentiles in a population.  
 242.  See generally William J. Moore, The Determinants and Effects of Right-To-Work Laws: A 
Review of the Recent Literature, 19 J. LAB. RES. 445 (1998) (reviewing literature assessing right-to-work 
laws’ impact on these outcomes and discussing methodological difficulties such studies face).  
  That European labor unions rely less than do U.S. unions on agency fees yet have been more 
powerful does not imply that abolishing agency fees in the U.S. won’t substantially weaken unions. For 
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right-to-work laws have found that agency fees increase both union 
density243 and unions’ ability to secure higher compensation for workers 
through collective bargaining,244 although conflicting studies exist as to 
both of these metrics of agency fees’ impact.245  
But there is precedent for deferring to legislative judgments, in the face 
of conflicting studies, that agency fees significantly impact these 
metrics—at least under the exacting scrutiny that Janus applied to public 
sector agency fees and that private sector agency fees would likely receive 
if the Court found those fees impinge on the First Amendment.246 
Moreover, even if right-to-work laws did not impact union density or 
unions’ ability to improve workers’ compensation through collective 
bargaining, studies have explained why agency fees make unions less 
effective in advancing economic equality through their political 
advocacy.247 Legislatures thus have strong grounds for concluding that 
agency fees advance economic equality. 
C. Necessity: Why Not Just Tax and Transfer? 
Why aren’t other policies adequate alternatives for reducing economic 
inequality’s transmission into political equality? Ganesh Sitaraman has 
ordered approaches to reducing this transmission into four analytical 
categories.248 First, countering economic inequality directly through 
policies that impede people’s ability to amass excessive economic power 
 
European labor law systems include many tools for strengthening labor unions that U.S. labor law lacks. 
Brishen Rogers, Three Concepts of Workplace Freedom of Association, 37 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 
177, 212–16 (2016) (concluding “[agency fees] . . . are superfluous in Europe, but essential in the United 
States”). 
 243.  E.g. David T. Ellwood & Glenn Fine, The Impact of Right-to-Work Laws on Union 
Organizing, 95 J. POL. ECON. 250, 250–73 (1987) (attributing to right to work laws an eight percent 
decline in union density); but see Moore, supra note 242, at 449–53 (discussing contrary studies and 
concluding “whether or not [right-to-work] laws reduce unionization remains an open question”). 
 244.  E.g. Henry S. Farber, Union Membership in the United States: The Divergence between the 
Public and Private Sectors 25–26 (Princeton Univ. Indus. Relations Section, Working Paper No. 503, 
2005) (finding that allowing agency fees increases unionized workers’ earnings by 3.7 percent without 
impacting non-unionized workers’ earnings); Gasper A. Garofalo & Devinder M. Malhotra, An Integrated 
Model of the Economic Effects of Right To Work Laws, 13 J. LAB. RES. 293 (1992) (accounting for unions’ 
impact on wages both directly through collective bargaining and indirectly through productivity effects, 
and finding that right to work laws have large negative effect on wages); Thomas M. Carroll, Right to 
Work Laws Do Matter, 50 S. ECON. J. 2, 499–502 (1983) (same); but see Moore, supra note 242, at 458–
60 (discussing studies finding right to work laws do not significantly affect wages). 
 245.  Supra notes 242-243. 
 246.  Supra notes 200–201 and accompanying text; see Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov’t PAC, 528 
U.S. 377, 394–95 (2000) (applying exacting scrutiny and deferring, in the face of conflicting studies, to 
legislative determination that large campaign contributions can corrupt our political system). 
 247.  Supra notes 216–226, 232–233. 
 248.  Sitaraman, supra note 91, at 1508-30. 
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in the first place.249 Second, safeguarding the political process from the 
transmission of that economic power—once it arises—into 
disproportionate political power. Third—a sub-species of the second—
incorporating countervailing powers into the political process. Fourth, 
“bypassing the political process,” including by trying to create a 
bureaucracy insulated from political influence.250 
Other scholarship explains shortcomings of approaches to 
safeguarding the political process, such as campaign finance regulation 
and lobbying reform, that do not build countervailing political power—
including those approaches’ shortcomings relative to labor law 
strategies.251 Likewise other scholarship explains shortcomings of efforts 
to insulate bureaucracy from the wealthy’s influence.252 I do not further 
address such strategies.  
I instead begin to analyze whether the possibility of countering 
economic inequality directly through policies that do not impinge on the 
First Amendment means First Amendment-impinging labor laws 
(assuming arguendo those laws impinge on the Amendment) are 
inadequately tailored to reducing wealth-based political inequality. Below 
I begin this analysis only for tax and transfer because the argument that 
tax and transfer constitutes a less restrictive alternative is the most 
intuitive and because insights from my discussion of tax and transfer 
apply to evaluating whether other vehicles for directly reducing economic 
inequality are less restrictive alternatives.  
I draw on principles discussed in Section III.A to explain why union-
 
 249.  Leading examples of such policy vehicles include tax, antitrust, corporate governance, 
common law rules of property and contract, id., and education policy. 
 250.  Id. at 1526–30.  
 251.  For literature documenting how political actors bypass campaign finance restrictions by 
devising new forms of political spending that the law has not anticipated or reached, see sources collected 
in Sachs, supra note 218, at 207 & notes 8–9 and 164 & notes 60–62. For an argument that campaign 
finance regulations are, partly for that reason, less effective at remedying wealth-based political inequality 
than are laws that facilitate poor- and middle-class persons’ organizing, see id. at 164–68; cf. Levinson, 
supra note 68, at 136–37.  
  The Court’s so far rejecting any compelling interest in political equality has further limited 
campaign finance regulations’ efficacy for reducing wealth-based political inequality. Even if the Court 
now found that a political equality interest justified campaign finance restrictions that the Court previously 
held violate the First Amendment, and even if those restrictions were as effective as union-strengthening 
laws in reducing wealth-based political inequality, that holding would not render those restrictions less 
restrictive alternatives to union-strengthening laws because that holding would not overrule the Court’s 
holding that those regulations impinge on the First Amendment.  
  For arguments that using heightened judicial review to invalidate laws that the wealthy unduly 
influenced would be an ineffective way to reduce wealth-based political inequality, see generally Einer 
R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31; see 
Andrias, supra note 43, at 491–93; Levinson, supra note 68, at 114–16, 118–20. 
 252.  E.g., Levinson, supra note 68, at 113–18. Even if we could insulate bureaucracy from the 
wealthy’s influence, agencies’ dependence on congressional authorization to act would limit the extent to 
which agencies could reduce wealth-based inequality.   
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strengthening laws are plausibly adequately tailored to reducing wealth-
based political inequality, despite the option of pursuing that goal through 
tax and transfer. At my argument’s heart is the fact that unions, unlike tax, 
reduce wealth-based political inequality through both Sitaraman’s first 
and third mechanisms: countering economic inequality directly and 
incorporating countervailing power into the political process. 
This fact helps explain why a mixed regulatory approach that relies on 
both progressive taxation and strong unions can be a more effective 
strategy for reducing economic inequality than an approach that tries to 
replace strong unions with increased taxation. To show that, I argue that 
although there are tax reforms that could advance economic equality as 
well as could any union-strengthening law if those tax reforms are 
enacted, adequately enforced, never later weakened or repealed, and 
updated over time to adopt to changing circumstances, we can expect the 
wealthy to organize to lengthen the odds of realizing those conditions. 
Because unions organize countervailing political power that can help 
resist the wealthy’s efforts to repeal or weaken redistributive taxation,253 
a strategy for reducing economic inequality that relies partly on union-
strengthening laws will likely be more effective in the long run than a 
strategy that substitutes increased taxation for those laws. 
That unions organize countervailing political power might not be a 
reason to rely on union-strengthening laws to reduce economic inequality 
if lawmakers could enact and implement what I will call a “circuit-
breaking tax regime”—that is, a tax regime that would sufficiently reduce 
economic inequality at Time One to eliminate concern about a wealthy 
class that has both the incentive and disproportionate political power to 
repeal or weaken that tax strategy at Time Two.254 But I show that it 
would be both likely impossible and possibly undesirably expensive to 
try to enact such a regime. 
Finally, so long as a circuit-breaking tax regime is untenable, a 
regulatory approach that substituted increased taxation for union-
strengthening laws could be less effective than a mixed regulatory 
approach at reducing wealth-based political inequality even were I wrong 
that this approach would be less effective over time than a mixed 
regulatory approach at reducing economic inequality. For if substituting 
increased taxation for strong unions can fully compensate for unions’ 
impact on economic inequality but cannot reduce economic inequality 
enough to prevent wealth-based political inequalities from exceeding 
 
 253.  Supra Section III.B.1. 
 254.  I need not here pin down exactly what would constitute such reform. Conceptually, we would 
need to decide what level of wealth-based distortion in political influence triggers a compelling interest. 
We would then face empirical difficulty in determining how much economic inequality would cause our 
democracy to leap that threshold. 
48
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 90, Iss. 2 [], Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol90/iss2/4
2021] POLITICAL EQUALITY 553 
whatever level triggers a compelling interest,255 unions’ function of 
organizing countervailing political power will combat those political 
inequalities in a way that such increased taxation does not. 
1. Progressive Tax’s Atrophy 
A court would reach this tailoring analysis only after agreeing that 
economic inequality gives economic elites undue political influence. 
Once legislatures enact progressive taxation, we can reasonably expect 
that economic elites will try to leverage that influence to repeal or modify 
that taxation. Political scientists have recorded these elites’ successful 
efforts to do so. Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson argue that groups favoring 
tax cuts have failed in recent decades to generate broad or salient public 
support for such tax cuts; since at least the 1980s, tax cut politics have 
instead been largely driven by organizations like the Club for Growth and 
Americans for Tax Reform that have relatively small, but unusually 
wealthy, memberships.256 This extraordinary wealth begets extraordinary 
campaign funding: Club for Growth was the primary funder, aside from 
the Republican Party, of Republican candidates in the 2002 midterm 
elections.257 These organizations have successfully leveraged a strategy 
of conditioning that campaign funding on candidates’ pledges to cut or 
not raise taxes—a strategy particularly targeting candidates on the 
congressional committees that are most influential in enacting tax cuts.258 
This strategy has enabled these organizations to achieve multiple 
upwardly-redistributive federal tax cuts since the 2000s.259   
Sure, we can expect the wealthy to similarly organize to weaken or 
repeal union-strengthening laws. But, again, labor unions, unlike tax, not 
only advance economic equality but also build resistance to the wealthy’s 
repeal efforts by simultaneously organizing countervailing political 
power. And tax law’s highly technical nature may make it easier to reduce 
tax laws’ progressivity in ways ordinary voters cannot easily see than it is 
to as-stealthily weaken unions through legislation or regulations.260 Even 
 
 255.  Supra notes 166–167 (explaining the Court need only select some plausible threshold at which 
wealth-based political inequalities trigger a compelling interest, even if a different threshold would also 
have been plausible). 
 256.  JACOB S. HACKER AND PAUL PIERSON, Tax Politics and the Struggle over Activist 
Government, in THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS: ACTIVIST GOVERNMENT AND THE RISE 
OF CONSERVATISM 256, 267–68 (Theda Skocpol & Paul Pierson, eds., 2007); see also SPENCER PISTON, 
CLASS ATTITUDES IN AMERICA 57 (2018) (similar); but cf. generally MICHAEL GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, 
DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS: THE FIGHT OVER TAXING INHERITED WEALTH (2011) (arguing the 2001 
estate tax repeal enjoyed substantial support across economic classes). 
 257.  HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 256. 
 258.  Id. at 268.  
 259.  Id. at 270–72.  
 260.  See id. at 271–72 (explaining “tax-cut advocates have learned how to design policies in ways 
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were tax law and labor law equally susceptible to being weakened over 
time by the wealthy’s political efforts, the wealthy might have a harder 
time repealing economically-redistributive laws in two different policy 
domains than in one. For all these reasons, a mixed regulatory approach 
that supplements tax strategies with labor law strategies could be more 
effective at advancing economic equality over time than an approach that 
relies solely on tax.  
2. Circuit-breaking Tax Is Likely Impossible 
 A circuit-breaking tax regime261 could, in theory, obviate concern 
that the wealthy will leverage their disproportionate strength to weaken 
or repeal progressive tax reforms. But the first reason to not require the 
government to pursue a circuit-breaking tax regime as a less restrictive 
alternative to union-strengthening laws is that such a regime is likely 
impossible to enact. 
i. The Inside-Outside Problem 
The very problem a circuit-breaking tax regime would aim to address 
likely renders that regime unattainable. Again, determining how 
redistributive a tax regime must be to be circuit-breaking is both 
conceptually and empirically difficult.262 But it seems reasonable to 
assume that circuit-breaking tax reform would need to be of a magnitude 
that the wealthy’s current outsized political power would render 
politically infeasible.263 And again, the tailoring inquiry should be 
sensitive to this reality when the compelling interest at issue is reducing 
economic inequality’s distortion of political influence.264  
ii. Tax Hydraulics 
Tax hydraulics further cast doubt on a government’s ability to effect 
circuit-breaking tax reform. By “hydraulics,” I refer to the process by 
which people and firms develop strategies to achieve their goals while 
paying less in taxes.265  
 
that make tax cuts look much smaller and more equitable” than they are); supra note 60 and accompanying 
text (arguing a policy area’s complexity can increase the wealthy’s political influence therein). 
 261.  Supra note 254 and accompanying text. 
 262.  Id. 
 263.  Cf. David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, Inequality Rediscovered, 18 THEORETICAL 
INQUIRIES L. 61, 70 & n.38 (2017) (noting wealthy’s influence over tax policy undermines premise that 
tax-and-transfer is interchangeable with “embedded ‘pre-distributive’ policies such as labor law”).  
 264.  Supra Section III.A.5. 
 265.  David Landau, Political Support and Structural Constitutional Law, 67 ALA. L. REV. 1069, 
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Through tax hydraulics, people and firms can exploit and even create 
tax loopholes.266 Although lawmakers sometimes intentionally 
incorporate so-called “loopholes” into tax laws to satisfy lobbyists, many 
tax loopholes were unintended by lawmakers. Scholars have suggested 
unintended loopholes are unavoidable.267 Loopholes might result when 
different parts of the tax code interact in unforeseen ways268—interactions 
that tax codes, due to their length and complexity, are susceptible to. 
Loopholes might alternatively result when tax rules are unintentionally 
underinclusive. This under-inclusiveness can occur when lawmakers 
could not think of or feasibly specify all the transactions to which they 
could apply a given tax rule269 or when a technology or business strategy 
arises after the tax was enacted to which the tax does not apply.270  
The problem of the “uncommon becoming common” marks one 
systematic way in which tax laws are particularly vulnerable to under-
inclusiveness. Lawmakers often tailor laws to only common 
circumstances. This is because uncommon circumstances are harder to 
foresee and, even if lawmakers do foresee them, the benefits of 
appropriately regulating a rare occurrence may not justify the costs of 
developing a more complex law.271 Yet when lawmakers take this 
approach to crafting tax law, taxpayers often learn that they can modify 
their behavior to achieve their goals via thereto uncommon—thereafter 
common—transactions or business strategies that lawmakers left 
undertaxed.272 
The extraordinary income that managers of hedge funds and private 
equity firms enjoy offers one illustration.273 The large fees these managers 
 
1075 (2016) (“The tax area is a clear example [of the hydraulics problem]: the complexity of the system 
often allows regulated entities and their lawyers to develop alternative strategies that achieve roughly the 
same goal as the path that has been shut down and without a substantial change in cost or other 
inconvenience.”). 
 266.  An uncontested definition of ‘tax loophole’ eludes commentators. See generally Heather M. 
Field, A Taxonomy for Tax Loopholes, 55 HOUS. L. REV. 545 (2018). I use the term (sometimes 
redundantly qualified with ‘unintended’) to denote tax advantages lawmakers did not intend to permit or 
create. 
 267.  Kyle D. Logue, Tax Law Uncertainty and the Role of Tax Insurance, 25 VA. TAX REV. 339, 
366 (2005). 
 268.  Sheldon D. Pollack, Arenas of Federal Tax Policy, 135 TAX NOTES 1499, 1505–06 (2012). 
 269.  Logue, supra note 267, at 365–66.  
 270.  Field, supra note 266, at 554. 
 271.  David A. Weisbach, Formalism in the Tax Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 860, 868 (1999). 
 272.  Id. at 863–64, 869 (1999) (illustrating via partnership income tax rules); see also Logue, supra 
note 266, at 366 (“[W]hat was a potentially small loophole with relevance to only a few transactions, and 
thus not worth worrying about, becomes a large loophole as enterprising tax advisors funnel money and 
clients through such gaps.”). 
 273.  For other examples of tax hydraulics, see Ronald J. Gilson & David M. Schizer, 
Understanding Venture Capital Structure: A Tax Explanation for Convertible Preferred Stock, 116 HARV. 
L. REV. 874, 876–77 (2003) (noting how the companies that venture capitalists finance issue convertible 
preferred stock “to shield incentive compensation from . . . ordinary income rates, so managers can enjoy 
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earn for investing other people’s money is taxed not at the income tax rate 
but instead at a much lower capital gains rate, due to partnership tax 
legislation and regulations that Congress and the IRS enacted before these 
types of firms were widespread.274 Although the preferential tax treatment 
these managers receive thanks to these laws is widely deemed 
indefensible,275 legislative history does not indicate Congress and 
regulators intended these laws to bequeath a windfall.276 On the contrary, 
some commentary suggests that these laws resulted from a routine 
extension of longstanding partnership tax principles.277 Indeed, the 
comparatively minor role that hedge funds and private equity firms played 
in our economy when these laws were enacted calls into question the 
extent to which Congress and regulators could have foreseen the 
extraordinary incomes that these laws would abet. 
Tax hydraulics may imperil lawmakers’ ability to effect circuit-
breaking tax reform   especially given the rise, particularly since the mid-
twentieth century, of an “income defense industry” of skilled 
professionals whom the wealthy can hire to resist taxes and other 
regulations.278 Government regulators have trouble staying ahead of this 
industry, whose members compete aggressively to find ways to minimize 
clients’ tax burdens.279  
Analyzing the potential cost-efficacy of approaches that governments 
could take to limit this industry’s ability to impede tax strategies for 
advancing economic equality is beyond this Article’s scope. My limited 
point here is that whereas the inside-outside problem suggests 
governments could unlikely amass political will to even try to enact a 
circuit-breaking tax regime, tax hydraulics suggest any such attempt to 
enact that regime might fail.   
 
. . . a preferential tax rate”); Sloan G. Speck, Tax Planning and Policy Drift, 69 TAX L. REV. 549 (2016) 
at 559, 575 (discussing corporate inversions and the estate and gift tax).   
 274.  Jacob S. Hacker & Paul Pierson, Winner-Take-All Politics: Public Policy, Political 
Organization, and the Precipitous Rise of Top Incomes in the United States, 38 POL. & SOC. 152, 170 
(2010) (discussing hedge funds); EILEEN APPLEBAUM & ROSEMARY BATT, PRIVATE EQUITY AT WORK: 
WHEN WALL STREET MANAGES MAIN STREET 272–75 (2014) (private equity firms). 
 275.  Applebaum & Batt, supra note 274. 
 276.  See Dean Galaro, Gregory Crespi, The Carried Interest Standoff: Reaffirming Executive 
Agency Authority, 70 S.M.U. L. REV. 153, 158–160. 
 277.  David A. Weisbach, The Taxation of Carried Interests in Private Equity, 94 VA. L. REV. 715, 
750 (2008). 
 278.  DANIEL MARKOVITS, THE MERITOCRACY TRAP: HOW AMERICA’S FOUNDATIONAL MYTH 
FEEDS INEQUALITY, DISMANTLES THE MIDDLE CLASS, AND DEVOURS THE ELITE 55 (2019).  
 279.  Logue, supra note 267, at 366 (“[C]ompetition induces tax advisors to compete to provide the 
most aggressive, tax-minimizing interpretations of the tax laws possible.”); see also Michael J. Graetz, 
Can a 20th Century Business Income Tax Regime Serve a 21st Century Economy, 30 AUSTRALIAN TAX 
FORUM 551, 556 (2015) (noting the U.S. has recently faced “a new aggressiveness in tax minimization by 
large business entities”). 
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3. Circuit-breaking Tax Would Possibly Be Too Expensive 
The likely impossibility of circuit-breaking tax reform should suffice 
to counsel against requiring the government to pursue such reform as a 
less restrictive alternative to union-strengthening laws. But a legislative 
judgment that such reform would be unduly expensive could be a separate 
ground for not demanding this alternative. Economists frequently argue 
that progressive tax carries some trade-off with economic efficiency and 
growth, although the magnitude of this trade-off for any given tax scheme 
is hard to determine.280 Specifically, debates continue about the extent to 
which progressively taxing income and wealth reduces entrepreneurship 
and innovation, labor supply, the effort people commit to their jobs, and 
people’s willingness to invest in obtaining education and training or 
invest their money more generally.281  
I take no position on whether the tradeoffs between progressive 
taxation and any of these drivers of economic growth would render 
circuit-breaking tax unduly expensive. One reason why I do not is that 
there is also substantial research indicating that economic inequality itself 
stunts economic growth.282 My limited point is that empirical debates 
about tradeoffs between progressive taxation and economic growth could 
provide grounds for a legislative judgment that circuit-breaking tax would 
be unduly expensive. That judgment could warrant deference on either of 
two grounds. First, it would constitute a predictive judgment because it 
would predict aggregate responses of economic actors over time to tax 
levels presumably much higher than the United States has yet imposed.283 
To whatever extent tax levels may have been closer to circuit-breaking 
many decades ago, changes in social and economic conditions since then 
make it hard to predict the extent to which the effects of such tax levels 
today would track the effects back then. Second, at least insofar as union-
strengthening laws receive only “exacting” scrutiny, such a legislative 
finding could earn deference under precedents in which the Court, while 
applying exacting scrutiny, deferred to legislative factual findings that 
some studies support but others refute.284 
Capital’s mobility across national and state borders further suggests 
circuit-breaking tax reform could be unduly expensive. Recent decades 
have brought conditions that enable people and firms to more easily move 
 
 280.  E.g., JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO THE 
DEBATE OVER TAXES, 100, 115 (4th Ed. 2008).  
 281.  Id. 
 282.  Jonathan B. Baker & Steven C. Salop, Antitrust, Competition Policy, and Inequality, 104 GEO. 
L.J. ONLINE 1, 8–9 & n.9 (2015).  
 283.  See supra Section III.A.4 (discussing deference to legislatures’ predictive judgments under 
exacting and strict scrutiny). 
 284.  Supra note 246. 
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capital across international lines.285 These conditions impede progressive 
taxation of personal and corporate income, because raising taxes on 
income earned from capital—a source of income that the wealthy 
disproportionately receive—incentivizes people and firms to “escape 
taxation easily by shifting capital to low- or no-tax jurisdictions.”286 This 
indicates that circuit-breaking tax reform might cause a degree of capital 
flight that sufficiently stunts economic growth to support a legislative 
prediction that such reform would be prohibitively expensive. 
Capital mobility between states within the United States would be 
relevant to assessing whether tax and transfer is a less restrictive 
alternative to state-level union-strengthening laws. Much recent empirical 
literature has detected a minimal relationship between state tax levels and 
firms’ location decisions.287 But for two reasons this empirical literature 
would not necessarily impugn a state legislature’s prediction that a 
circuit-breaking tax regime would drive enough business into other states 
as to render that regime unduly expensive. First, this literature 
presumably288 has not observed firms’ responses to circuit-breaking tax 
regimes. Second, for game theoretical reasons elaborated elsewhere,289 
this literature does not even rule out the possibility that tax incentives 
significantly influence firms’ location choices between states that subject 
firms to tax levels below circuit-breaking.  
Debates air too over the extent if any to which unions reduce economic 
growth. My point is merely that, given tailoring analysis’s cost sensitivity, 
a legislative judgment that circuit-breaking taxation could unduly impair 
economic growth would counsel against requiring a legislature to pursue 
such a regime as a less restrictive alternative to union-strengthening laws.  
In sum, then, political feasibility concerns, and possibly cost concerns, 
should bar deeming circuit-breaking tax to be a less restrictive alternative 
to First Amendment-impinging union-strengthening laws. And efficacy 
concerns likely bar deeming taxation short of circuit-breaking levels a less 
restrictive alternative to such laws. 
 
 285.  Graetz, supra note 279 (noting “a technological revolution” has allowed “information and 
money, and in some cases products and services, to be moved around the world with the click of a 
mouse”); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare 
State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1575 (2000) (noting globalization has increased capital’s mobility). 
 286.  Id. at 1576, 1625.  
 287.  James R. Rogers, The Law and Policy of State Tax Competition: Much Ado About Nothing?, 
4 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 101, 101–02 & n.1 (2006).  
 288.  I write ‘presumably’ because I have not attempted to determine exactly what would constitute 
a circuit-breaking tax regime.  
 289.  Rogers, supra note 287, at 104–06.  
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D. Over- and Under-inclusiveness and Proportionality 
I do not address over-inclusiveness, because the over-inclusiveness 
inquiry repeats the above necessity inquiry except for a consideration not 
here relevant.290 For two reasons I do not discuss under-inclusiveness at 
length. First, a government’s taking some, but not all possible, steps to 
reduce wealth-based political inequality does not trigger the under-
inclusiveness inquiry’s first concern: the concern that the challenged state 
action will be a futile strategy for advancing the state’s interest in 
avoiding a given harm if the state action fails to regulate other conduct 
that causes that harm.291 The harm caused by wealth-based political 
inequality is one of degree: I assume courts would agree that governments 
have a compelling interest in meaningfully reducing that inequality, even 
if governments do not completely equalize political influence among 
constituents. That latter goal, again, seems likely impossible. 
Second, the government’s failing to pair union-strengthening laws with 
maximal use of every other regulatory vehicle for reducing wealth-based 
political inequality unlikely implicates the under-inclusiveness inquiry’s 
second concern: that content- or viewpoint-based suppression of speech 
was lawmakers’ real goal in enacting a challenged law.292 The political 
feasibility and cost-efficacy considerations I discussed with respect to 
circuit-breaking tax reform are more plausible reasons why governments 
do not maximize those tools’ service for reducing this inequality.  
I do not explicitly analyze proportionality, because the Court lacks 
clear criteria for that analysis.293 But the political feasibility and cost-
efficacy considerations that I discuss with respect to circuit-breaking tax 
reform would bear on that analysis. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Court should recognize that our federal and state governments 
have compelling interests in reducing economic inequality’s transmission 
into political inequality (put differently, “wealth-based political 
inequality”). Unions advance that interest in two overlapping ways: by 
bolstering low-income and middle-class people’s political power to 
influence public policy and by, both through that political power and 
through collective bargaining, reducing economic inequality. Public 
sector agency fees, which the Court recently held violate the First 
Amendment, help unions advance this interest. So do other union-
 
 290.  Supra notes 180, 255 and accompanying text. 
 291.  Id. 
 292.  Fallon, supra note 40, at 1327. 
 293.  Supra note 182 and accompanying text. 
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strengthening laws that many people worry the Court now might hold also 
impinge on the First Amendment. 
Not only do these laws help reduce economic inequality’s transmission 
into political inequality. They are also quite plausibly adequately tailored, 
for First Amendment purposes, to that objective. Other scholarship 
discusses how strong unions can be more effective at reducing that 
transmission than are various strategies for safeguarding the political 
process, including campaign finance restrictions and lobbying 
restrictions. This Article focused instead on showing why replacing 
strong unions with increased taxation would unlikely be as effective in 
reducing wealth-based political inequality as would be a mixed regulatory 
approach that relied on both strong unions and progressive taxation. The 
root of why is that strong unions, unlike tax and transfer, both increase 
economic equality and organize countervailing political power among 
low-income and middle-class people. A circuit-breaking tax regime that 
would effectively eliminate concern about wealth-based political 
inequalities is likely impossible and could be undesirably expensive. 
Absent a circuit-breaking tax regime, unions’ organization of 
countervailing political power helps prevent the wealthy from, over time, 
weakening or repealing progressive taxation. For that reason a mixed 
regulatory approach can be more effective over time at reducing economic 
inequality than an approach that replaces strong unions with increased 
taxation. Even were a mixed regulatory approach not more effective over 
time at reducing economic inequality, unions’ role in organizing 
countervailing political power would likely make a mixed regulatory 
approach more effective at reducing wealth-based political inequality.  
Arguing that union-strengthening laws advance an interest in reducing 
wealth-based political inequality could raise concerns that have caused 
the Court to, in its campaign finance decisions, reject a compelling 
interest in political equality. The core of those concerns was the Court’s 
fear that judges lack tools to assess whether alleged inequalities in 
political influence actually exist. But recent advances in social science 
offer new tools for measuring wealth-based, as well as gender- and race-
based, political inequality. These advances call for the Court to reassess 
its aversion to recognizing a compelling interest in political equality. 
Although this Article focused on unions’ role in advancing wealth-based 
political equality, those social science tools and much of this Article’s 
argument support additionally recognizing compelling interests in 
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